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1. Introduction  
 
 
1.1 Background and rationale   
 
When the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia Herzegovina (GFAP), 
also known as the Dayton peace agreement, ended the civil wars in Bosnia 
Herzegovina (hereafter BiH or Bosnia) in November 1995, the situation in many 
Bosnian cities was still tense and the future stability uncertain. In Mostar and Brcko 
the situation was particularly instable. The two cities were divided along ethnic lines 
and the task to reunite the cities politically and administratively was seen as a 
tremendous challenge. Political elites who not long before had fought against each 
other were now meant to cooperate within common institutions. The aim of this thesis 
is twofold, 1) to present and examine the principles behind the institutional system for 
local governance in the two cities after the civil war, but 2) also to discuss which of the 
structures that most effectively have contributed to the promotion of cooperation 
between the local political elites.  
 
Within the conflict literature there is a broad consensus that inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation is of vital importance in order to restore peace and to manage ethnic 
differences in post-civil war transitions. There are, however, divergent views on what 
kind of institutions and mechanisms are most effective in bringing such cooperation 
about. One perspective, the consociationalist camp, argues that institutions have to 
offer political security through a group-based institutional structure that make ethnicity 
and group protection as the fundamental determining principle. The opposing 
perspective, which is found in the integrative camp, argues that institutional structures 
have to offer motivating incentives for cooperation through institutions that seek to 
obliterate the ethnic divide.  
 
This thesis is formulated in the context of these opposing viewpoints and the debate 
between the two approaches. The aim is to investigate the merits of the institutional 
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structures in Mostar and Brcko in contributing to inter-ethnic elite cooperation and 
thereby provide insights into the relations between institutional structure and inter-
ethnic elite cooperation.  
 
The rationale for undertaking this study is three-fold: firstly, both the consociationalist 
and the integrative arguments have been criticised for lacking empirical support. This 
study seeks to contribute with empirical data that systematically compares the validity 
of the approaches.  
 
Secondly, the two models were developed in the Cold War era, and the assumptions 
related to elite motivation and elite behaviour are founded on ethnic divided societies 
with a different character and a different actor picture than the Post-Cold War era 
contained. After the Cold War, international actors have become directly engaged in 
conflict management and peace restoration. Studies of the consociational and 
integrative structures in this context have been undertaken, but few have taken into 
consideration the international actor dimension of contemporary conflict. An analysis 
of Mostar and Brcko, where international actors have played important roles, provides 
a good opportunity to outline propositions of how IC affect the inherent mechanisms 
of factual structures.  
 
Thirdly, many studies have focused on the potential of the models to achieve stability 
and democracy. Few have, however, focused on the mechanisms inherent in the 
models which is meant to bring this about; the cooperation between elites. This can be 
seen as a shortcoming, and a study focusing on this step in the theories is overdue.  
 
A comparative study of post-war Mostar and Brcko will contribute insights on all 
these three fields and thus, the hope is, provide valuable insight into power-sharing 
theory.  
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1.2 Research questions  
 
This study of institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and 
Brcko will be conducted through a two-step analysis:  
 
The first step will be to determine whether the Mostar and Brcko institutional 
structures can be placed within the consociational or the integrative theoretical 
paradigms. This will be done through an examination of the foundation documents that 
devise the institutional structures for the cities, the Mostar Interim Statute issued in 
1996 and the Brcko District Statute issued in 2000.  
 
The first research question set to answer is:  
 
1) Which elements of the two theoretical models of power-sharing can be identified in 
the Mostar Interim Statute and the Brcko District Statute? 
 
The second step will be devoted to examining the relation between the institutional 
structure devised and level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation among the political elites 
in the two cities. The question set to answer is:  
 
2) Of the institutional structures in respectively Mostar and Brcko, which contributed 
most effectively to the promotion of cooperation between the local elites?  
 
The Mostar Interim Statute was issued in February 1996. In 2004 a new statute entered 
into force. The period examined with regard to the level of inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation in Mostar is the period under the institutional system defined by the 1996 
Interim Statute, from February 1996 to 2004. The Brcko District Statute was issued in 
March 2000. This statute is final and is still the foundation of the institutional system 
in Brcko. The period examined with regard to the level of inter-ethnic cooperation in 
Brcko is the period since the enactment of the Brcko Statute, from March 2000 to 2005. 
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1.3 Conceptual clarifications and delimitations  
 
Institutional structure is a wide concept and needs to be clarified. For the purpose of 
this thesis, institutional structure is meant to refer to the political local institutions that 
either can be seen as consociational or integrative institutions.  
Three elements of institutional structure will be emphasised: 
i) the principle for territorial division of power, ii) the rules and mechanisms for 
representation and iii) decision-making rules and veto provisions. These three 
mechanisms will be used to determine whether the over-all structure in Mostar and 
Brcko is consociational or integrative.  
 
Elite cooperation between different segments (Lijphart 1977) or between different 
ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985) is a prevalent feature both in consociational theory and 
in the integrative approach. Neither Lijphart nor Horowitz provide any explicit 
definition of what they mean by elite cooperation. Implicitly, however, they see elite 
cooperation through the act of moderating nationalist claims and seeking consensus 
(Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985) Caspersen (2004: 570) defines inter-ethic elite 
cooperation as “willingness and acceptance on the part of political leaders to 
compromise and to rule inclusively rather than exclusively”. This definition is adopted 
in the following because it both captures the initial meaning of Lijphart and Horowitz 
and because it is measurable.  
 
The degree of inclusive or exclusive behaviour and the level of compromise will be 
determined through an examination of three processes and aspects dependent on inter-
ethnic elite cooperation: i) the process to establish the institutions ii) Elite responses to 
electoral dynamics and rules of representation and iii) the over-all functionality of the 
institutions. The reason for choosing these three aspects rests on the assumption that if 
the establishment process was long and difficult, the level of inter-ethnic cooperation 
was low. If elites responded negatively to electoral dynamics, the level of inter-ethnic 
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elite cooperation was low. If the institutions did not function, the level of inter-ethnic 
elite cooperation was also low.  
This thesis is formulated within the power-sharing tradition in conflict literature. The 
concept of power-sharing can be understood narrowly or broadly. Lijphart has adopted 
a narrow understanding and sees power-sharing as equivalent to consociationalism 
(1977: 25). Caspersen (2004) share Lijphart’s understanding. This narrow 
understanding excludes Horowitz integrative model from the power-sharing concept.  
 
In this thesis a broad understanding of the concept of power-sharing is adopted. This is 
in line with Horowitz (1985) Timothy Sisk (1996), Harris and Reilly (1998) and the 
Carnegie Project group (2001/2002). In their understanding power-sharing is “those 
political systems that foster governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, 
mobilized ethnic groups in society” (Sisk 1996: 4). Sisk includes the integrative model 
as a power-sharing approach. In the same way, Harris and Reilly (1998: 141) argue 
that “the consociational and integrative approaches can be fruitfully viewed as 
opposite poles in a spectrum of power-sharing institutions and practices”. 1  This 
interpretation is adopted in this thesis, accordingly power-sharing hereafter refers to 
both the consociational and integrative models.2  
 
Both consociationalism and the integrative approach have developed over a period of 
time, and many scholars have come to regard themselves as consociationalists or 
integrativist. When presenting the models in this thesis, the writings of Lijphart and 
Horowitz will be the points of reference. This is because they are regarded as the 
scholars who initially coined the consociational and integrative models. As of yet they 
are still regarded as the key spokesmen of the models.  
 
1.4 Methodology  
 
The comparative case study  
                                                 
1 These viewpoints are based on the argument that also the integrative mechanisms and the integrative approach 
over-ell, seek to promote government coalitions that are broadly inclusive of all ethnic groups, but through 
different mechanisms than the consociational approach (Carnegie Project 2001/2002).  
2 “Models” and “approach” will be used interchangeably.  
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The research design applied in this thesis is a comparative case study. A case-study is 
an empirical enquiry that looks into a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context (Yin 2003: 13). According to Charles Ragin, the goal of comparison is to 
explain and interpret macro-social variation (1987: 5) (my emphasis).  
This corresponds to the aims of this thesis; on the one hand, I will identify and explain 
which theoretical elements that can be found in the power-sharing agreements in 
Brcko and Mostar. On the other, I will interpret the relation between the institutional 
structures and the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. As previously outlined, the 
over-reaching purpose of this investigation is to examine the competing proposition 
related to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation proposed by 
consociational theory and the integrative model.  
 
Selection of cases  
The cities of Mostar and Brcko are selected as the empirical cases for investigation in 
this thesis. The cases are selected because they share some similar features, but also 
contrast each-other on some points, which make them interesting cases for a 
comparison. Among the similarities between the cases that makes them interesting to 
compare with relation to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation, is 
that the war had some of the same effects on both cities; in both Mostar and Brcko the 
population and settlement patterns had been altered due to the war. Both cities had 
become divided in ‘ethnic’ zones where each ethnic group controlled each zone and 
established their own institutional structures. In both cities the war-time parallel 
structures proved resistant and reintegration of political-administrative structures 
immediately after the signing of the Dayton agreement was seen as a challenge by 
international observers.  
 
Among the differences that are interesting in relation to institutional structure and 
inter-ethnic elite cooperation are the differences in international strategies. While 
international actors in Brcko were directly involved in political life through an 
international transitional administration until 2004, the international transitional 
administration of Mostar ended in 1996. This difference makes it possible through an 
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comparison of Mostar and Brcko to outline some propositions about how the 
international dimension has affected the relation between institutional structure and 
inter-ethnic elite cooperation.  
 
The comparative case study and modes of generalisation 
A general objection to the case-study design is the lack of ability to produce general 
knowledge. Statistical generalisation, that is “an inference made about a population 
(or universe) on the basis of empirical data colleted about a sample” (Yin 2003: 32) is 
not possible to make based on a case-study, and indeed not the aim. Cases can not be 
seen as ‘sampling units’, rather they are unique categories and due to this, the mode of 
generalisation is restricted. While Mostar and Brcko represent some of the general 
developments and challenges faced by a number of local divided cities and 
municipalities, data and analyses from this study are only meant to provide 
information about these particular empirical situations. 
 
Analytical generalisations, however, is a type of generalisation that the case-study 
framework can provide. Analytical generalisation is related to the use and 
development of theory, “a previously developed theory is used as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the case-study” (Ibid). This gives room for 
engaging in a theoretical debate on a particular field, and based on a comparative case 
study contribute with insights of importance related to the strength, validity and 
evolution of the theory. As previously mentioned, this is an aim with this study.  
 
Sources and data collection  
Due to the nature of the case study design where the opportunity to use several sources 
of evidence is present and due to the need to maximize the validity of a study within 
such a framework, data triangulation is a strategy often used and encouraged (Ibid: 97-
101). Data triangulation refers to exploring several sources of information and 
evidence (ibid). This strategy is employed in this thesis and both primary and 
secondary sources have been obtained through documentary review, archival research 
and interviewing.   
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Primary sources employed are the Dayton Peace Agreement and its annexes (1995) the 
Interim Agreement for the City of Mostar (1996) (hereafter the Mostar Statute) the 
Brcko District Final Award (2000), The Statute for the Brcko District (2000) (hereafter 
the Brcko District Statute). In addition to these official agreements, election results 
from municipal elections in 1997, 2000 and 2004 are employed, as well as press 
releases form the Office of the High Representative (OHR).    
 
The secondary sources relied on in this thesis have different forms and variants. A 
useful source has been the Office of the High Representative media round up archive.3 
The archive contains articles from BiH newspapers from 1999 till today. Every day is 
covered. The rationale for using relevant articles related to political life in Brcko and 
Mostar from this archive is that they offer detailed information on developments from 
day to day. Thus, offers the opportunity to follow the detailed developments in 
relevant cases and gives in depth insights into processes in addition to outcome.  
 
The advantages of the archive are that it is relatively extensive, articles from several 
newspapers are found either in full text or in a summary form. In addition, the articles 
are translated into English, which make them accessible also for non-Bosnian speaking 
persons. However, it has to be emphasised that in the translation process, information 
may have been lost, in addition only a selection of articles is included. In spite of these 
shortcomings, I found the archive to be a useful source of information, and the 
disadvantages mentioned are taken into account. 
 
Another useful source of information has is reports and evaluations produced by 
international actors present in BiH. In particular, the High Representative’s reports to 
the UN Secretary General and the Brcko supervisor’s annual reports to the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) have been useful. Moreover, both developments in 
Brcko and Mostar have gained attention from independent think-tanks and research 
groups. International Crisis Group (ICG) and European Stability Initiative (ESI) 
                                                 
3 The archive can be found on: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp  
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reports have been consulted, in addition to other books and articles that examine 
developments in BiH in general and  Mostar and Brcko in particular.  
 
In addition, two interviews have been conducted in the last part of the data collection 
process. My informants were Mr. Robert Farrand, international Supervisor in Brcko 
from March 1997 to June 2000 and Mr. Finn Lynghjem, Head of the Regional Office 
of the High Representative (South) in Mostar from January 2000 to January 2001. The 
aim with the interviews was to complement already obtained information. The 
interview with Mr. Farrand was conducted by e-mail. Interviewing by e-mail has 
disadvantages compared to interviewing in person. It is a limited provider of 
information since the dialogue is replaced by monologue, it is only possible to get 
written data and you loose the advantage of nuance in the interview. In spite of this, I 
found the e-mail interview to be an informative approach, which has supplemented the 
other data in a fruitful way.  The interview with Mr. Lynghjem was a telephone 
interview. It was formulated as an open interview, where the aim was to cross-check 
the information obtained by other sources related to Mostar in the period 2000-2001 
and to get Mr. Lynghjem’s elaboration on some of the points.  
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis   
 
This chapter has introduced the research questions, the background and rationale for 
this study and its methodological approach. Chapter 2 will briefly describe the 
situations in Mostar and Brcko before, during and immediately after the war. The aim 
is to provide an overview of the contexts and situations in which the power-sharing 
agreements for the two cities were signed. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. It starts with a presentation of the power-sharing approach to 
conflict management, before turning to Lijphart’s and Horowitz’ approaches to 
institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation. The chapter ends with an 
outline of two analytic models derived from the two theoretical approaches and with 
pointing at challenges to the theoretical framework. Chapter 4 and 5 provide an 
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analysis of institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and 
Brcko. Chapter 4 is devoted to an examination of the Mostar Interim Statute and the 
Brcko Statute. It seeks to answer which elements of the theoretical models that can be 
identified in the two statutes, providing an answer to the first research question posed. 
Chapter 5 goes on to discuss the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and 
Brcko in order to investigate which of the institutional structures devised that most 
effectively contributed to the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation, providing 
and answer to the second research question posed. In chapter 6, the findings from the 
empirical analysis will be summarised and a conclusion provided.  
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2. Background: War and international intervention in 
Mostar and Brcko – the background of the power-sharing 
agreements  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the background for the signing of the power-
sharing agreements in Mostar and Brcko and to provide a brief presentation of Mostar 
and Brcko prior to, during and immediately after the civil war. This chapter first gives 
a brief account of Mostar before and during the war, and thereafter describes the 
establishment of the international administration in the city and the road to the Interim 
Statute, signed in 1996. Thereafter, the situations in Brcko prior to and during the war 
are briefly accounted for before turning to the establishment of the international 
supervisory regime and the background for the Brcko District Statute, issued in March 
2000.  
 
 
2.1 Mostar prior to and during the war  
 
Before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 Mostar was an economic, 
political and cultural centre. The Mostar Valley was a significant industrial area with 
factories producing helicopters, aluminium, beverages, clothes and agricultural 
products. The main river of the Herzegovina region, the Nerevta, divided the city into 
two unequal parts, the greater and more developed West and the smaller and hilly East 
(Reichel 2000: 2). Historically, the city had been the chief administrative city of the 
Ottoman Empire in the Herzegovina region from the late 15th century before becoming 
a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878. Mostar became part of Yugoslavia in 
the aftermath of World War I.  
 
In 1991, there were 76,000 inhabitants in the city, of whom 34 per cent were Bosniac, 
29 per cent Croat and 19 per cent Serb. The remaining 18 per cent chose the 
supranational identification of ‘Yugoslav’. The whole of the Mostar municipality area, 
including the town’s surrounding cluster of villages, had 126,000 inhabitants – 35 per 
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cent Bosniacs, 34 per cent Croats, 20 per cent Serbs and 11 per cent Yugoslav.4 In the 
town of Mostar about 6,000 Croats lived among the east bank’s nearly 35,000 
residents. At least 15,000 Bosniacs were among the 45,000-plus on the west bank. 
Large minorities of Serbs were spread across both sides of the city. Thus, Serbs, 
Muslims and Croats lived intermixed in a city with one of the most multiethnic 
population structures in Bosnian (Bose 2002: 98).  
 
Due to its multiethnic population and historical heritage, Mostar had for decades 
symbolized the very idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a blend of South Slavic, 
Ottoman Turkish and Mediterranean cultural traditions could exist side by side, and 
where Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim people lived distinctively, but together and in 
mutual tolerance (Silber and Little 1996: 291). The outbreak of war in BiH in early 
1992 and the subsequent three years with civil war in the country dramatically 
changed this picture of Mostar.  
 
The outbreak of war in BiH was a consequence of and a part of the dissolution of the 
Republic of Yugoslavia.5  Since 1991, after the declaration of independence of the 
Croatian and Slovene republics, the Balkans became destabilised and war between the 
newly independent states and Serbia broke out. BiH was recognised by the EU on 6 
April 1992, and at the same time the war broke out between Bosnian Serbs, Bosniacs 
and Bosnian Croats.6
 
Following the declaration of independence of BiH, the Yugoslav People Army (JNA) 
gradually established control over Mostar and kept the city under siege for nine 
months before the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and Bosniac military groups 
jointly drove out the Serbs.7 Then the Croats turned against the Bosniacs and began a 
                                                 
4 The numbers are from the 1991 census and referred to in Bose (2002: 99-100).  
5 A number of books analyzes and describes the break up of Yugoslavia and the civil wars in the Balkan. See for 
instance Woodward (1995); Silber and Little (1996); Mønnesland (1999); and Gallagher (2003).  
6 The political goals of the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, backed by Serbia and Croatia, respectively 
was to establish ethnically homogenous territories which would eventually become part of Serbia and Croatia, 
and to divide the ethnically mixed BiH between a Serbian and a Croat part. The goal of the Bosnian Government, 
which was controlled by the Bosniacs, was the territorial integrity of BiH, since Bosniacs were a majority in BiH 
and had most to lose from partition (Kaldor 2001: 33).  
7 For a good account of military groups and structures, see Kaldor (2001: 44-57).  
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bloody ten-month ‘war within the war’. Both groups came to claim the city as a place 
of cultural heritage, and used torture, forced expulsion, rape and murder the fightings 
(Reichel 2000: 2). 
 
The Bosniac-Croat fighting ended with the Washington-agreement (March 1994) 
which established the Muslim-Croat Federation in BiH. Despite end of fighting, the 
situation in Mostar was tense and instable. Compared to before the war, Mostar was 
unrecognizable. The town centre was totally destroyed and the city divided between 
Bosniac and Croat controlled areas. The Bosniacs controlled most of the east-bank of 
the Nerevta river, while the Croats had control over most of the west-bank (Bose 2002: 
104).  
 
The demographic composition of the city and the population patterns had changed 
dramatically. In the Bosniac-controlled zone only a few dozen Croats, out of 
approximately 6,000 before the war, remained (Ibid: 105). About 85 per cent of the 
45,000-plus Bosniacs who had lived in what had become the HVO-controlled zone 
had either fled or been expelled. Fewer than a thousand Serbs remained in the city, of 
an urban Serb population of perhaps 20,000 in 1991 (Ibid). Politically, the HVO and 
HDZ controlled the western part, while SDA controlled the eastern part of the city. 
Both claimed and wanted to control more. Against the background of the tense 
situation, the presence of international actors was necessary in order to re-establish 
Mostar as a secure multiethnic city.  
 
 
2.2 Mostar under EU administration and the road to the Interim Statute.  
 
The international organisation given a leading role in Mostar was the EU. Shortly after 
the Washington agreement in March 1994 a special interim European Union 
Administration of Mostar (EUAM) was established.8  The EUAM drew its mandate 
from the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on 5 July 1994 by the EU, 
                                                 
8 The administration was in place in July 1994 and was headed by the German Hans Koschnick, former social-
democrat mayor of Bremen. He was the Head of the administration to March 1996. 
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The Western European Union (WEU) member states, the two mayors of Mostar, the 
Bosniac Safet Orucevic and the Croat Miljo Brajkovic as well as Alija Izetbegovic, the 
President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic for the Federation and Jadranko Prlic 
as the representative of the Bosnian Croats. 
 
The EUAM was stipulated to last for maximum two years and to assist and supervise 
the process of physical and economic reconstruction, refugee and displaced people 
return and generally assist in return to normal life in the city (MoU 1994). In addition 
was the over-reaching task and aim “to contribute to a climate leading to a single, self-
sustaining, multiethnic administration” (MoU 1994). This latter responsibility was in 
particular a great challenge for the administration. Mostar was physically divided in a 
Croat and a Bosniac controlled zone. A system of parallel Croat and Bosniac political 
institutions and structures had been established during the war. To integrate these 
institutions into one system of local governance met resistance among the political 
elites.  
 
After a series of negotiations, the Interim Statute for the City of Mostar, issued 20 
February 1996 was accepted.9 The agreement contained a detailed description of the 
form of one common system of local governance for the city based on power-sharing 
between the Croats, Bosniacs and ‘others’. The new structure was to be established 
through local elections, which were held in June 1996. The mandate of the EUAM 
ended in January 1997 and an EU Special Envoy was appointed to oversee the process 
to form the institutions after the elections and to assist in the process.  
 
Now, Mostar’s period under direct international administration was over, and the main 
responsibility to implement the Interim Statute and reintegrate the city’s political and 
administrative structure, rested on the local politicians but under continued 
                                                 
9 Before reaching the Interim Statute, Mostar’s administration was mentioned in the Madrid Agreement about 
Mostar (24 October 1995), in the Dayton Peace Accord (annex) (10 November 1995), in the Rome agreement 
(18 February 1996). For a comparison of the suggestions in the Rome Agreement compared to the Interim 
Statute, see ICG report (2000).  
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international surveillance through the establishment of the OHR regional office in 
Mostar. 
 
2.3 Brcko prior to and during the war  
 
Before the war the Brcko area had developed into as an agriculture and – because of its 
proximity to the Sava River and its link to the Tuzla Basin – a transportation centre for 
wood, coal, anthracite, agriculture/animal products and chemicals.  
 
Due to its location, the Brcko area had historically “represented a cross-roads between 
peoples and empires” (Reichel 2000: 9). 10 As a result, the area has been the home of a 
mix of Serb, Croat, Bosnian and other ethnic groups.  Orthodox Christian, Catholic 
and ‘Muslim’ religions had existed side by side for centuries. Especially Brcko city 
was prior to the war known for its multi-ethnicity. 40,000 people lived in the city, 
among these 55 per cent were Bosniacs, 20 per cent Serbs and 7 per cent Croats. 18 
per cent were Yugoslavs and others. The population living in the towns and villages in 
the rest of Brcko municipality was a plurality Croat (42 per cent), followed by 
Bosniacs (34 per cent) and Serbs (21 per cent) (Dahlman and Tuathail 2004: 1).11
 
When hostilities erupted between Serbia and Croatia in 1991, the town of Brcko which 
housed a Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) barrack was in the centre of the conflict. 
Brcko was not, however, a typical Serb war plan target. The Serb plans focused on 
consolidating control over areas considered to be currently or historically Serb. 12  
Rather, Brcko was targeted for purely strategic reasons. Due to its location, in a 
strategically necessary overland route between the Serb areas in the west and east of 
                                                 
10 In 1699, following the conclusion of the Traety of Karlowitz, the Sava River became the border between the 
Ottoman and Habsburg empires. For the next two centuries, Brcko represented the western-most reach of the 
Ottoman Empire. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which, however, remained under Ottoman sovereignty until 1908, when this too was assumed by 
Austria- Hungary (Reichel 2000: 9).  
11 The numbers are from the 1991 census, referred to in Dahlman and Tuathail (2004) and cited with permission 
from the authors.  
12 Such as the areas Western Bosnia and the Drina River valley in Eastern Bosnia. Claims to land were typically 
founded on either current or historic Serb majorities and, in some cases vague historical legends, including the 
notion that most Bosniacs were really Serb.   
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Bosnia, it was seen as important for the Serbs to gain control over Brcko (Siber and 
Little 1996).  
 
In late 1991 Serb para-military troops arrived in Brcko and began to trail local Serb 
volunteers. At the same time, the JNA confiscated weapons from the Bosnian 
Territorial Defence Force in Brcko. In April 1992, Serb forces – composed of JNA 
regular and irregular forces – began their assaults on Brcko and destroyed the roads 
and rail bridges over the Sava River. The Serb forces encountered limited resistance in 
the town. After six days of fighting Serb forces had taken control of the city and the 
area extending several kilometres south and west of the town (Reichel 2000: 10). The 
rest of the Brcko municipality was defended in a cooperative effort by Bosniac and 
Croat armies. The local relations between the Croat and Bosniac armies apparently 
survived the larger Bosniac-Croat war that raged in central Bosnia from 1992 until the 
Washington agreement that formed the basis for the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH) in March 1994 (Dahlman and Toal 2004: 9).  
 
At the time of the final cease-fire and the signing of the Dayton Agreement, Brcko 
municipality was divided by a frontline that had remained more or less stationary for 
three years.  In the northern part of the municipality, the Serbs retained military control 
through the wartime administration run by local Serb Democratic Party (SDS) 
politicians and their allies. The southern part of the municipality was further divided 
between Croat and Bosniac armies loyal to the Croat democratic Union (HDZ) and 
Party for Democratic Action (SDA) leadership, respectively (Ibid).  
 
As in Mostar, the demographical composition of the population had changed 
dramatically. Over 30,000 Bosniac and Croat residents had been driven out of the Serb 
controlled areas, while about 55,000 Serbs displaced form the FBiH had been 
encouraged to go to Brcko in search for “abandoned” apartments (Ibid: 2).  
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2.4 Brcko arbitration and the international supervisory regime 
 
Contrary to the future of Mostar, for which the Dayton agreement contained some 
general lines, the future of Brcko was left unsolved. During the peace negotiations all 
parties agreed that whether Brcko should be governed by the FBiH or the Serbian 
Republic (RS) should be left to international arbitration with a final decision to be 
made within a year (GFAP 1995:  annex 2, Art. 5). When this overreaching question 
was settled, an administrative governance structure that took into account the ethnic 
division of the city should be decided. In 1999 the arbitral tribunal declared that Brcko 
should neither be governed by the FBiH or the RS. Instead, Brcko was established as 
an autonomous District, only subordinate to the state level (Final Award 1999).  
 
As a part of the four year long arbitration process it was decided to establish an 
international supervisory regime in Brcko, headed by the OHR. In March 1997 U.S 
Ambassador Robert Farrand was appointed to be the international supervisor of Brcko. 
The supervisor was given wide authorities. His overarching task was to oversee and 
assist in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Brcko. More 
specifically, one of his main tasks was to prepare a “statute of District Government” 
and a detailed plan and schedule for the formation of a District Government (Final 
Award 1999: Para. 38). The statute was issued 7 December 1999 and enacted in March 
2000. It contained a detailed plan for the institutional structure of the District based on 
power-sharing.  
 
This chapter has described the contexts and the background for the agreements that 
stipulate the administrative and governance structures of Brcko and Mostar. In both 
cities, the aim with the institutions stipulated in the statutes was to reintegrate political 
institutions that had been divided along ethnic lines during the war. Both agreements 
were based on the concept of power-sharing. In the next chapter theories of power-
sharing and elite cooperation will be presented.  
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3. Theoretical approach: power-sharing theory and inter-
ethnic elite cooperation  
 
 
This thesis is formulated in the framework of two distinct theories of power-sharing; 
the consociational theory, as presented by Arend Lijphart and the integrative approach, 
as presented by Donald Horowitz. This chapter will first provide a presentation of the 
basic arguments inherent in power-sharing. Thereafter, Lijphart’s consociational 
theory and Horowitz integrative model will be presented with emphasis on their 
approaches to institutional mechanism and inter-ethnic elite cooperation.  In the end of 
the chapter, Lijphart’s and Horowitz’ approaches will be summarised, and the different 
expectations that can be derived from the theoretical models will be discussed, in order 
to challenge, but also establish, an analytic framework.   
 
 
3.1 The power-sharing approach in conflict literature  
 
3.1.1 Opposing strategies for conflict management in the conflict literature  
Within the literature on conflict resolution and conflict management there are 
divergent views on how to deal with conflicts in ethnically heterogeneous states in 
cases where the division has led to outbreaks of violence and civil wars.  
 
One perspective sees restoration of peace, stability and democracy as impossible 
unless strategies that are designed to achieve a correspondence between the 
population’s ethno-political allegiances and the borders of the state are put into 
practice. One such strategy is to “rightsize” states, i.e., adjusting state boundaries or 
creating new states (Hoppe 1998; O’Leary, Lustick and Callaghy 2001). Another 
strategy, eagerly endorsed by among others Chaim Kaufmann, is “forcible partition” 
or even population transfers (Kaufmann 1996; 1998 and 1999; Mearsheimer and Van 
Evera 1995; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997). According to them, ethnic violence implies 
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that civil politics can not be restored unless “ethnic groups are demographically 
separated into defensible enclaves” (Kaufman 1996: 137).13
 
The strategies proposed by partition theory have been challenged on moral, practical 
and legal grounds:  a number of researchers have focused on how to manage ethnic 
conflicts while protecting the existing state boundaries (Lijphart 2002 and 2004; 
Carley 1997; Horowitz, 1985: 588-92 and 1997: 435; Kumar 1997; Sambains 2000; 
Gurr 1993: 290-292). Scholars within this stand are arguing that stability and 
democracy is achievable in ethnic divided states through mechanisms that can 
accommodate the need both of majority and minority groups. 14  Common for the 
mechanisms they suggest is that they are meant to cope with and decrease the security 
dilemma in ethnic divided societies through some form of power-sharing between the 
different groups.  
 
3.1.2 Two models of power-sharing: Consociational theory and the integrative model  
Within the power-sharing approach tradition the two of the main theoretical models 
are consociational democracy and the integrative model. The consociational approach 
is closely connected to the writings of Arend Lijphart. He presented his arguments in 
1969, later in the book “Democracy in Plural Societies” in 1977 and since then in a 
number of books and articles. The alternative, integrative model was coined by Donald 
Horowitz with the book “Ethnic Groups in Conflict” in 1985.  
 
Both of the models were originally developed in order to explain types of group 
accommodation in selected fragmented societies in Western Europe and the nation-
building processes of pluralistic (Lijphart 1977) or deeply divided (Horowitz 1985) 
                                                 
13 These arguments are not new. John Stuart Mill (1860: 230) argued that democracy is “next to impossible in a 
country made up of different nationalities”.  The line of argumentation of to day’s proponents of partition and 
separation is mainly based on the security dilemma (Sambanis 2000: 438)  “The dilemma in its purest form 
arises when one community faces a distrustful other and one’s own actions to increase one’s own security is 
perceived as threatening the security of others” (Jervis 1978).  The security dilemma is originally a central 
feature of realist International Relations thinking, originally seen as a feature of the system of international 
relations, but have been transferred to a civil war context on the basis of the characters of civil wars (Posan: 
1993).   
14 Such mechanisms can be federalism, different forms of autonomy, institutional provisions that ensure 
representation for all groups in public and political institutions, an electoral system that ensures representation.  
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societies in the new independent states formed as a result of de-colonisation. Later, the 
models have been developed further and also been criticised. They have become a 
focal point of both empirical and theoretical debate.15
While the models share some common features, they differ in their approach to how 
inter-ethnic elite cooperation best can be promoted. These differences are fundamental 
in devising the analytic framework of this thesis and will be presented below.  
 
 
3.2 Consociationalism: Lijphart’s approach to inter-ethnic elite cooperation  
 
3.2.1 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation through institutionalised security 
Lijphart’s argument is that inter-ethnic elite cooperation will best be promoted within 
an institutional structure that provides a basic political security for all major groups in 
the society (Lijphart 1977).  His two main assumptions are i) that elites play a crucial 
role in conflict management and ii) that ethnicity as a pertinent factor and cleavage in 
divided societies can neither be overlooked nor manipulated to disappear with the help 
of institutional mechanisms (Ibid). 16  On the contrary, Lijphart stresses that the 
institutions have to recognise ethnic division by including the principles of self-
determination within a common state and group protection as foundation principles for 
rules of representation, territorial division of power and rules of decision-making.  
 
The rationale behind devising a system that is founded on group protection 
mechanisms is that it creates a basic political security. When security for all groups is 
obtained through guarantee mechanisms, political elites from different ethnic groups 
will both find it rationally and morally right to cooperate.  
 
                                                 
15 For a brief overview of the evolution of the models and their main proponents, see Carnegie Project for 
Complex power-sharing and Self-Determination (2001/2002). For a summary of the main lines of debate 
between the models, see O’Leary (2005)  
 
16 The argument behind these assumptions is vested on Lijphart’s static approach to ethnic identity. He does not 
consider ethnic identity to be fluid and changeable, as is argued by what can be defined as the instrumentalist 
approach to ethnicity. The opposing  primordial view, which sees ethnicity as a feature obtained by birth, is not 
either endorsed by Lijphart. Rather, placing these approaches along a continuum, Lijphart is placed closer to the 
primordial pole than the instrumentalist. He considers efforts aimed to break up group loyalties and replace 
ethnic identity with other identity factors, as likely to be unsuccessful (Lijphart 1977).   
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The model which Lijphart argues will create this security and cooperation, contains 
four institutional devices; i) the grand coalition, ii) a mutual veto, iii) the principle of 
proportional representation and iv) segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977: 25-44). 
Lijphart maintains that each of these four mechanisms will lead towards political 
security. He describes them as “devices for providing added protection and security”. 
They are providing a “feeling of security”, “a powerful stimulus” or outright “an 
important guarantee of political security” (Lijphart 1990: 30-31, 37, 41).  
 
3.2.2 Security mechanisms that promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation  
Grand Coalition 
The first mechanism Lijphart suggests is a power-sharing government; a grand 
coalition, with representatives from all significant groups (Lijphart 1977: 25-36). A 
grand coalition will, according to Lijphart, ensure that all groups will be included in 
the decision-making process.  It thus ensures that policy choices have support from an 
overwhelming majority rather than a minimum winning coalition. Because of the lack 
of trust between the different ethnic groups after a civil war, it is better to be in 
government with your counterpart than to trust him to govern in favour of your 
interests when you are in opposition (Ibid: 31). A strong opposition, which is the 
common feature of majoritarian systems, is moreover avoided (Ibid: 26). Thus, 
Lijphart maintains the presence of a grand coalition is a remedy for creating political 
security.  
 
Mutual veto 
However, as minorities can still be outvoted in a grand coalition, an additional 
safeguard mechanism is necessary: all groups have to be able to veto decisions that 
would infringe on their vital interests (Ibid: 36-38). The groups will through the veto 
be given the opportunity to block political decisions.17 One way to institutionalise a 
veto is by “concurrent majority” provisions, according to which a majority in all 
                                                 
17 Lijphart emphasises that one might think the veto will create an ineffective system fraught with dead-locks. He 
argues that this will be avoided: firstly, the veto shall be mutual, which would reduce the incentives to use it. 
Secondly, there is always a risk that it will be used against you, therefore the mere presence of it will promote 
moderate attitudes that make it unnecessary to use. Thirdly, the fear of deadlock will prevent a frequent use 
(Lijphart 1977: 37).  
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groups must support a decision in order to make it valid. Lijphart characterises the 
veto as “the ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect their vital interests” 
(Lijphart 1990: 495).  
 
Proportional representation 
Proportional representation of all groups in both public and political institutions is a 
third principle emphasised by Lijphart (Lijphart 1977: 38-41).  In order to ensure 
proportional representation the electoral system is an important mechanism. Lijphart 
prescribes a proportional electoral system (PR). The PR system ensures, according to 
Lijphart, that the strength of the most numerical groups is not augmented by the 
electoral system. 18  “For divided societies, ensuring the election of a broadly 
representative legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR is undoubtedly 
the optimal way of doing so” (Lijphart 2004: 100). Lijphart states that a PR system is 
clearly preferable to majoritarian one (Lijphart 2002: 52).  
 
Segmental autonomy  
In addition to the mechanisms that regulate representation and inclusion in the political 
institutions, Lijphart prescribes “segmental autonomy”. That means that the ethnical 
groups are self-governing in issues that are not of common interest (Lijphart 1977:41-
44). This form for self-government can be ensured both by territorial or non-territorial 
division of power. If a group is geographically concentrated, Lijphart prescribes a form 
of ethnic federalism: a system in which federal units that are largely ethnically 
homogenous are given extensive autonomous powers. If the groups are geographically 
inter-mixed, Lijphart prescribes a form of non-territorial federalism, or functional 
autonomy. On issues such as schools and language, the ethnic groups are given 
autonomy and are therefore provided with means for protecting their identity.  
 
The ultimate goal with segmental autonomy is to provide political security and self-
government for the groups, thus allaying fears and allowing for greater cooperation at 
the elite level. Lijphart also supports the idea that “good social fences may make good 
                                                 
18 As it would in a majoritarian electoral system.  
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political neighbours” (Lijphart 1971: 11). The more separated differing groups are in 
the society, the less likely there is to be conflict.    
 
3.2.3 Why will elites cooperate across ethnic lines when political security is guaranteed?  
Against the background of political security created by the mechanisms above, inter-
ethnic elite cooperation will be promoted (Lijphart 1977).  How and why do the 
security mechanisms bring this about? - Lijphart does not devote much attention to this 
question. His theory is mainly founded on inductive observations, and his answer is 
basically empirical in nature. He can demonstrate that cooperation has been the 
consequence in a number of countries where the mechanisms described above have 
been part of the institutional structure (Lijphart 1977). 19  However, his general 
characteristics of elites and elite motivations serve as legitimating the argument. 
Lijphart sees political elites as responsible actors in a political game. The elites will 
actively engage in inter-ethnic elite cooperation both because it is morally right and 
rational.  
 
Firstly, Lijphart pronounces that the political elites in ethnic divided societies will 
realise the grave dangers posed by the ethnic differences in the society. Therefore they 
will choose to transcend mass-antagonism through cooperation (Lijphart 1994: 228; 
1977: 52-55). Elites will rationally recognise “the centrifugal tendencies inherent in 
plural societies” and “deliberate effort to counteract these dangers” (Lijphart 1977: 
165). Thus, the inherent potential of violent conflict in ethnic divided societies will, 
according to Lijphart serve as a motivation for elites to cooperate when a basic 
political security is assured through the institutional system.   
 
In addition, it is rational for political elites to cooperate based on the logic of “political 
power incentives”. In order for elites to stay in power it is often rational to reach 
compromises with their coalition partners (Lijphart 2002: 44). Without compromise 
they will not play any role and diminish their chances to be re-elected. Lijphart argues 
                                                 
19 The countries he refers to are among others South-Africa, Northern -Ireland, Fiji, Belgium, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands (Lijphart 1977; 1994).  
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that elites will behave more moderately and cooperative because this is the only way to 
gain influence. Ethnic leaders will seek power, and in order to be part of the 
institutions he prescribes, cooperation is needed 
 
 
3.3 The integrative model: Horowitz’ approach to inter-ethnic elite cooperation  
 
3.3.1 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation through integrative dynamics 
Horowitz’ argument is that inter-ethnic elite cooperation best will be promoted within 
an institutional structure that creates integrative dynamics and seeks to obliterate 
ethnic divisions (Horowitz 1985). His main assumptions are that elites need incentives 
in order to cooperate, not only security guarantees, and that ethnic identity is fluid and 
changeable.20 He maintains that “boundaries do change, and it is possible to consider 
the design of measures to utilize shifts in group identity in the interest of conflict 
reduction” (Ibid: 66). Elites will cooperate not because an institutional structure 
provides security, but because the structure he prescribes produce ‘integrative 
dynamics’, that is, dynamics that leads to cooperation and integration (Horowitz 1991a: 
154-160; 1985: 597-600). 
 
3.3.2 Integrative dynamics that promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation  
Ethnicity is given a minimal role  
Horowitz’ model is not as specifically designed as Lijphart’s. It stands forth more as a 
set of principles than a list of proposals for the nature of the different institutions. One 
of his main concerns is that ethnicity as a line of division is not made more salient and 
important than it has to be. He argues for institutions that promote “policies that 
encourage alignments based on interest other than ethnicity” (Horowitz 1985: 599). He 
admits that it seems unlikely in deeply divided societies “that non-ethnic lines of 
cleavages, such as those based on social class and territory, can be manipulated so as 
to displace ethnic cleavages”. But, “some measures may provide the impetus for non-
ethnic lines of cleavage to compete for attention with ethnic cleavages” (Horowitz 
                                                 
20 Here Horowitz is much closer than Lijphart on the primordialist-instrumentalist approach line. Sisk (1996: 12) 
use Horowitz as an example to explain the instrumentalist view. See for example Horowitz (1985: 32): 
“Virtually all ranked systems of ethnic relations are in state of a rapid transition” and “Group boundaries are 
made of neither stone nor putty. They are malleable within limits” (Ibid: 66).  
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1985: 599). Based on these principles, Horowitz’ approach has been characterised as 
an approach that “eschews ethnic groups as the building blocks of a common society” 
(Harris and Reilly 1998: 140).  
 
A preferential electoral system  
One of the concrete mechanisms Horowitz suggests to promote integrative dynamics is 
the electoral system (Horowitz 1985: 598). He does not put as much emphasis on 
proportionality as Lijphart does, but advocates that the electoral system shall give the 
political elites and the ethnic parties incentives to moderate their position and engage 
in cross-ethnic appeal. He argues for a system that not necessarily secure proportional 
representation. Rather, the system he proposes rewards elites who are motivated to 
engage in cross ethnic coalitions and thus to cooperate (Horowitz 1991a: 141).  
 
The system he proposes is a preferential system. According to Horowitz the dynamic 
which fosters moderation and cooperation in such a system is simple; a candidate’s 
election will depend on attracting voters from outside his / her ethnic group, and it 
therefore forces the candidate to moderate. Horowitz asserts that the incentives built 
into the system will foster the creation of pre-electoral inter-ethnic coalitions in order 
to ensure elections. The basic idea is that voters will most likely cast their first 
preference vote along ethnic lines; however they may be swayed to cast lower 
preferences across the ethnic divide. Thus, it is here up to the endeavours of the elites 
to assure that they are represented.  
 
Non-ethnic federalism- heterogeneous federal units   
Federalism or devolution is seen as another institutional device that provides 
incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation (Horowitz 1985: 601-602; 1991b: 122-124). 
But contrary to Lijphart, Horowitz does not prescribe federalism as a means to ensure 
ethnic self-government. Federalism, in Horowitz approach, should preferably be based 
on ethnically heterogeneous political units, which is argued to foster integrative 
dynamics. Thereby, the self-determination principle prevalent in the consociational 
model is denied in the integrative approach. The rationale for Horowitz is that people  
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living in and elites representing the same federal unit will develop common interests 
and have an incentive to cooperate with each other in order to successfully compete 
against the other federal units (Horowitz 1985: 676-680).   
 
 
3.3.3 Horowitz’ critique of Lijphart’s elite assumptions 
Horowitz developed his integrative approach as a reaction against Lijphart. In 
particular he objects to the way Lijphart assumes that elite cooperation and moderation 
will automatically occur as long as guarantee mechanisms are established. Lijphart, 
according to Horowitz, fails to specify how the institutional mechanisms he prescribes 
will promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation and moderation.  
 
A central objection of Horowitz against Lijphart’s consociational model is directed at 
Lijphart assumptions about elites’ motivations for inter-ethnic cooperation. Horowitz 
objects to the assumption that elites will see cooperation as morally and rationally 
right in an institutional system that does not give any strong, direct incentives for 
cooperation. Horowitz argues that to assume that elites out of ‘good will’ will 
cooperate, as he means Lijphart does, is a flawed assumption. The elites will often lack 
the freedom of action to cooperate due to intra-ethnic party competition (Horowitz 
1985: 574-579).  
 
In addition, it is not evident that elites are willing to cooperate. He emphasises the 
“self-interest nature” of elites and argues that in many instances it can be natural for 
elites to refrain from cooperation, even in a system that ensures political security. 
“There are no reason to think automatically”, Horowitz writes, “that elites will use 
their leadership position to reduce rather than pursue conflict” (1991: 141). He has 
found in his examinations of various divided states that “the very elites who were 
thought to be leading their peoples away from ethnic affiliations were commonly 
found to be in the forefront of ethnic conflict” (Horowitz 1985: 97). Due to these elite 
motivations, elites are not prone to cooperate in a system that does not offer awards 
and incentives, as the integrative model does.  
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3.4 Brief comparison of the approaches  
 
Lijphart and Horowitz are agreeing that institutional structure is a pertinent aspect in 
conflict management and group accommodation. This is because the structures and 
mechanisms affect the way elites cooperate across ethnic lines. They both build their 
models for conflict management of the interplay between institutions and inter-ethnic 
elite cooperation.   
 
They disagree, however, over which mechanisms are most effective in bringing this 
cooperation about. While inter-ethnic cooperation according to Lijphart is promoted 
by security mechanisms based on group protection, cooperation in Horowitz’ approach 
is seen as a result of institutions and mechanisms that contribute to diminish the role of 
ethnicity and seek to obliterate ethnic differences. While Lijphart focus on group 
protection and self-determination of the groups, this is not a priori in Horowitz 
approach. The aim is to obliterate ethnic divide rather than to reflect ethnic division in 
the institutions. Based on these arguments, they prescribe, as summarised below, 
different institutional mechanisms for territorial division of power, for rules of 
representation and for decision-making in ethnic divided societies.    
 
Table 3.1: Summary of mechanisms in the two power-sharing models 
 
Principle  Consociational model 
mechanisms  
Integrative model 
mechanisms  
Territorial division of 
power 
Autonomy / federalism 
Homogenous units 
Devolution 
Heterogeneous units  
Principle of representation 
in political institutions 
-PR 
- Ethnicity based group 
representation 
- Preferential system  
- ‘ethnic blind’ 
representation 
Principle of decision-
making in political 
institutions 
Vital-interest veto  No requirements 
mentioned  
 
 
Thus, the consociational proposition is that an institutional structure containing the 
consociational mechanisms will most effectively foster inter-ethnic cooperation:  
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Security mechanisms Inter-ethnic elite cooperation 
 
 
The opposing integrative proposition is that an institutional structure containing the 
integrative mechanisms will most effectively foster inter-ethnic elite cooperation:  
 
Integrative incentive structures Inter-ethnic elite cooperation 
 
 
In the following analysis, the mechanisms described in table 3.1 will form the 
analytical framework for locating the Mostar and Brcko institutional structures within 
the consociational or integrative paradigm. Based on the findings, the propositions 
presented above related to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation will 
be tested through an examination of the degree of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in 
Mostar and Brcko.  
 
 
3.5 Challenges to the analytic framework  
 
As previously mentioned, both the consociational and the integrative models were 
developed during the Cold War. After the Cold War the nature of international 
relations and the ways of dealing with civil wars and ethnically divided states have 
changed profoundly (Kaldor 2001).  Both Lijphart and Horowitz argue that their 
models and the assumptions underlying them are of general validity, and that their 
models also are fruitful ways to accommodate ethnic differences after contemporary 
civil wars (Lijphart 2002; Horowitz 2004). In civil wars in the post-cold era 
international actors have been engaged in conflict management of ethnically divided 
states in a more direct and substantial way than during the cold war.21  However, 
neither Lijphart nor Horowitz have given any considerations as to how international 
actors affect elite behaviour and elite motivations.  
 
 
                                                 
21 For two different comprehensive approaches to and examinations of contemporary international involvement 
in peace restoration and conflict resolution see Paris (2004) and  Jeong (2005)  
 29
We here see an empirical changed picture, where one additional actor, the international 
community, through a range of international organisations, adds to the actor picture. 
Lijphart’s and Horowitz’ models for inter-ethnic elite cooperation and conflict 
management of ethnically divided societies completely ignore this actor. There is a 
discrepancy between the actor perspective in the models and the actor perspective in 
reality. This is a serious shortcoming with the models and the conditions on which 
they are vested and a challenge when testing their propositions in contemporary post-
Cols War divided societies.  
 
It is natural to assume that the direct involvement of international actors in conflict 
resolution after civil war will affect both elites’ incentives and motivations for 
cooperation. While the main focus of the examination of the nature of inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation in Mostar and Brcko in chapter five will be on testing the consociational 
and integrative propositions outlined above, the role of international actors will be 
integrated and taken into account and possible extended models for perceiving the 
relation between institutional structures and inter-ethnic elite cooperation in a post-
cold war environment will be proposed.  
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4. The power-sharing agreements of Mostar and Brcko 
 
In this chapter the nature of the Mostar Interim Statute and the Brcko District statute 
will be examined. The chapter will provide an exploration of which institutional 
mechanisms from the theoretical models presented in the previous chapter that can be 
found in the Statutes. The examination will focus on i) the principles for territorial 
division of power, ii) the rules for representation with emphasis on electoral system 
and reserved seats and iii) whether the veto mechanism is incorporated. An 
examination of these three elements will make it possible to locate the institutional 
structures of Mostar and Brcko within the integrative or the consociational paradigm, 
providing an answer to the first of the research questions posed.  
 
 
4.1 Territorial division of power stipulated in the Mostar and Brcko Statutes  
 
4.1.1 Territorial division of power in Mostar  
The Interim Statute established Mostar as a highly decentralised city. Within the city 
of Mostar, six city-municipalities were established. The six city-municipalities were 
given the names Mostar-South, Mostar-South-West, Mostar-West, Mostar-South-East, 
Mostar-North and Stari Grad (old town) (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 5). 22   The 
background for this internal division of the municipality was the situation on the 
ground created by the war. The division represented the demarcation lines created 
during the war and in practice the three city-municipalities Mostar-South, Mostar -
South -West and Mostar-West were controlled by the Croats while Mostar-South-East, 
Mostar-North and the Old Town were controlled by the Bosniacs (OHR 2003: 51).  In 
the area around the main line of demarcation between the Croats and Bosniacs, a 
Central Zone was established (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 5; Art. 61-65).  
 
While Mostar prior to the war had been administrated as one single unit, the 
establishment of the six city-municipalities meant that Mostar now would have two 
                                                 
22 See annex 2 for the size and geographical reach of the city-municipalities.  
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layers of governance. Each of the city-municipalities was to have their own City-
Municipality Councils and City-Municipality Administrations (Ibid: Art. 55-56). In 
addition, a common City Council and a City Government were established (Ibid: Art. 
14).23  
 
The City Government was given the responsibility to administer the Central Zone and 
the rights to exercise sole authority in the spheres of finance and tax policy, urban 
planning, infrastructure, economic policy and public transport, including the city’s 
railway station and airport. The mayor was empowered to set up departments to 
manage these five fields of activity (Ibid: Art. 7). All other responsibility was left to 
the six city-municipalities. This included for instance education and social services 
(Ibid: Art. 7; Art. 52).  
 
In relation to the theoretical models, the previous chapter presented Lijphart as a 
proponent of territorial autonomy. In practice, autonomy can be expressed through 
decentralisation of functions and a vertical division of power between layers of 
governance. Transferred to local governance, the Mostar model in relation to division 
of powers is in line with Lijphart’s thinking. The Statute established a central 
institution, the City Government, responsible for common tasks, while the city 
municipalities were responsible for all other tasks.  
 
In addition, Lijphart favours ‘homogenous populated units’. In Mostar, the lines 
between the six city municipalities in practice created three homogenously populated 
Bosniac units and three homogenously populated Croat units. Thus, the principle of 
territorial division of power underlying the Mostar statute is in line with the 
consociational theoretical model.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 See annex 3 for a chart of the structure.  
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4.1.2 Territorial division of power in Brcko  
 
For Brcko, the Final Award and the Brcko Statute, established Brcko city and its 
surrounding areas as “a single administrative unit of local self-government existing 
under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Brcko Statute 2000: Art. 1(1)). Due 
to the contested character of the city and its surroundings, the established District was 
made autonomous, governed by its own laws and only subordinate to the state level.24  
 
The geographical reach of the district was to consist of three pre-war municipalities. 
This means that a more centralised unit than the pre-war organisation was established. 
All powers that earlier had been held by the entities and the three pre-war 
municipalities were to be transferred to a newly established District Assembly and a 
District Government (Ibid: Art. 1(2)).  
 
In relation to the two theoretical models the principles for a territorial division of 
power in Brcko is more in line with Horowitz’s than Lijphart’s principles. Brcko was 
established as one heterogeneous populated unit. The ethnic population structures and 
the divisions created during the war were not made as foundations for new internal 
administrative divisions.  Horowitz argues, as mentioned, that heterogeneous units 
have several advantages. In addition, no vertical division of powers between different 
layers of governance is stipulated for. The only political institutions were the District 
Government and the District Assembly, responsible for all tasks. Thus, the principle 
underlying the territorial division of powers in Brcko corresponds more to the 
integrative model than the consociational one.  
 
Table 4.1:  Territorial division of power, Mostar and Brcko   
City Mostar Brcko  
Territorial division of 
power  
Consociationalism  Integrative model  
 
                                                 
24 As previously accounted for, both the RS and the Federation claimed control over the area, and in order to 
avoid conflict, the area was established as a District, but still a unit of local governance. For Mostar, the 
Cantonal level and Federation level are between the state and municipality level. Brcko is directly under the state.  
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4.2 Rules of representation  
 
Both Lijphart and Horowitz argue for different methods to ensure the representation of 
all communities. Both put however emphasis on the electoral system as such a 
mechanism. In addition, Lijphart sees it as important that the composition of the 
institutions reflect the ethnic composition of the population. According to Bieber, a 
reserved seats mechanism is the electoral tool providing the most certain guarantee for 
obtaining such a composition (2005a: 90).  
 
 
4.2.1 Electoral system and reserved seats in Mostar  
 
The regulation for elections, and thus the determination of the electoral system of 
Mostar was not accounted for in the Interim Statute. Article 18 stated that these issues 
would be stated in a special Decree on the conduct of elections (Interim Statute 1996: 
Art. 18). In accordance with this decree, and subsequent documents, the electoral 
system for election of the City Council and the Municipality Councils was a 
proportional system (Bose 2002: 119).  
 
Related to seat reservations, the Statute entailed this guarantee mechanism for ensuring 
group representation in the City Council, the City Government and the six City-
Municipality Councils.  
 
The City Council should consist of 48 councillors. 16 seats were reserved for Bosniacs, 
16 for Croats and 16 for ‘others’.25 (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 16(2)).  Later, the 
number of councillors was reduced to 30, then with 10 seats reserved for  Bosniacs, 10 
for Croats and 10 for ‘others’. The representation of the groups in the City 
Government was ensured through the article that stated that the mayor and the deputy 
mayor should be from different communities (Ibid: Art. 44) and that when appointing 
the heads of departments, the mayor should take the national composition of the 
population into consideration (Ibid: Art. 47(4)).  
                                                 
25 ‘others’ refers mainly to Serbs.  
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At the city municipality level, the six municipalities each were to have City-
Municipality Councils with 25 members, which would reflect their territory’s pre-war 
national demography regardless of the size or population of the city-municipalities 
(Ibid: Art. 56(3)). Article 56 (3) ensured representation of all groups in the Councils 
through a determination of the number assigned to each group in each city 
municipality (Figure 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: Composition of the six City-Municipalities Councils (Interim Statute, art 
56(3).  
 
Municipality Croats Bosniacs Others
Mostar-North 4 11 10 
Mostar-Old Town 4 12 9 
Mostar-South-East 3 19 3 
Mostar-South 12 6 7 
Mostar South-West 12 6 7 
Mostar West 10 6 9 
 
 
In relation to the theoretical models, Lijphart argues for a PR system and ethnic 
representation while Horowitz for a preferential system. The electoral system adopted 
in Mostar is thus in line with the consociational model.  
 
Moreover, Lijphart is a proponent of a system that takes into consideration the ethnic 
division of the society, and which make ethnicity as the basis for rules, representation 
and decision-making. With regards to representation, the reserved seats model in 
Mostar is, in line with Lijphart, based on ethnicity. Representation of all communities 
is ensured through quotas both in the City Council and in the six City-Municipality 
Councils. In addition, group representation is also ensured in the City Government. In 
Horowitz’ account, such a mechanism for guaranteed representation is not mentioned. 
Thus, the reserved seats principles in the Mostar Statute are in line with the 
consociational theoretical model.  
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4.2.2 Electoral system and reserved seats in Brcko   
 
The Brcko Statute, as the Mostar Statute, did not include provisions for an electoral 
system. However, the Annex to the Final Award states that “in establishing the District 
electoral system the supervisor may select the any voting mechanism that, in his 
judgement, will promote full and fair representation of all elements of the District’s 
multi-ethnic population” (Annex to the Final Award 1999: Para. 9). On 26 May 2000 
an interim Election Commission for the District was established by the supervisor in 
accordance with the Rules and Regulation of the Provisional Election Commission 
(PEC) (OHR Press Releases: 2000b). In October 2003 a Law on Elections was adopted 
by the District Assembly, and the law provided for a system of proportional 
representation to elect the 29 councillors of the District Assembly (Supervisor report 
2004).  
 
Related to reserved seats, this guarantee mechanism for representation was not 
stipulated in the Brcko Statute. The article related to the composition of the Assembly 
only stated that the Assembly was to be composed of twenty-nine Councillors (Brcko 
Statute 2000: Art. 24 (1)). A president and a vice-president of the Assembly were to be 
elected from among the councillors at the first session of each new electoral term (Ibid: 
Art. 29). The candidate who would receive a three-fifths majority of the total number 
of Councillors should become the President (Ibid: Art. 30 (1).)26  
 
The District Government should, according to the Brcko Statute, consist of the mayor 
and the heads of departments. The mayor should be elected by the Assembly (Ibid: Art. 
47(1)) and was given the responsibility to appoint the heads of departments. The 
Statute stated that the appointments should be based on “professional criteria” and that 
the “heads of government shall reflect the composition of the population” (Ibid: Art. 
48(1)).  
 
                                                 
26 If no candidate receives the required majority in the first election, a second election is held. The candidate who 
receives a majority of votes of the total number of councillors becomes the president. If no candidate receives a 
majority in the second election, a third election will be held.   
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In relation to the theoretical models, the electoral system adopted in Brcko, a PR 
system, is in line with consociationalism. A striking feature with the Brcko Statute in 
relation to rules of representation is that no references to ethnicity and stipulation of 
reserved seats for the communities are included.27 A ‘grand coalition’ is however, as 
in Mostar, ensured by stating that the heads of departments shall reflect the 
composition of the population. In relation to the theoretical models, Horowitz favours 
a political system where ethnicity is not made the dominant factor and that political 
life, among which the rules of representation is one of several elements, shall strive to 
be ‘ethnicity blind’. Thus, the lack of reserved seats based on ethnicity as we find in 
the Brcko Statute, is here in line with the integrative model.  
 
Table 4.3: Rules of representation, Mostar and Brcko  
Principle Mostar Brcko 
Rules of representation 
- Electoral system 
- Reserved seats 
 
Consociationalism 
Consociationalism 
 
Consociationalism  
Integrative model  
 
 
4.3 Decision-making procedures and veto rights  
 
4.3.1 Decision-making procedures and veto rights in Mostar  
In Mostar, decisions, or resolutions, in the City Council were to be made by the 
majority of the given votes (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 31(1)). In addition, the Statute 
contains provisions about a veto mechanism. If issues which are being voted on 
concerns the fundamental interests of one of the peoples, “the majority of votes in 
every people is needed apart from the majority of all votes” (Ibid: Art. 31(2)).  
 
In relation to the theoretical models, decisions making procedures in detail are not 
accounted for, but as previously demonstrated, Lijphart proposes a fundamental 
interest veto as one of his five security mechanisms. Horowitz does not propose such a 
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mechanism. The inclusion of the veto mechanism as a principle in the decision-making 
procedure for the City Council makes thus corresponds to the consociational model.  
 
 
4.3.2 Decision-making procedures and veto rights in Brcko  
In Brcko, the Brcko Statute stipulates that decisions shall be adopted by a simple 
majority of the Councillors present and voting (Brcko Statute 2000: Art. 33), with the 
exception of decisions concerning certain issues, where a three-fifth majority of the 
total number of councillors (Ibid: Art. 34(1)).28 Here, no fundamental interest veto 
provisions were stipulated, which makes the Brcko procedure more in line with 
integrative thinking.  
 
Table 4.4: Veto provisions, Mostar and Brcko  
Principle  Mostar Brcko 
Veto provisions Consociationalism  The integrative model 
 
 
4.4 Summary of the findings  
 
This chapter has examined the Interim Statute which entailed the framework for local 
governance institutions of Mostar and the Brcko Statute which outlined the framework 
for governance of Brcko. The aim has been to place the systems within the theoretical 
models described by Lijphart and Horowitz. The principles for territorial division of 
powers, rules of representation and decision-making and veto provisions have been 
examined.  
 
The findings suggest that related to territorial division of power, the Interim Statute of 
Mostar is in line with the consociational model while the Brcko Statute is more in line 
with integrative thinking. When it comes to rules of representation, both the electoral 
systems in Mostar and Brcko are PR systems, thus corresponding to the consociational 
                                                 
28 These issues were: the adoption of rules and procedures of the Assembly, the Brcko District budget, Brcko 
District Laws, dismissal of all persons elected by the Assembly, consent of the Mayors appointments of the 
Districts Police chief and deputy chiefs (Brcko Statute 2000: Art. 34).  
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model. The principle of reserved seats for each community in the Mostar Statute also 
is in the line of consociationalism. In Brcko, however, no such provisions are included, 
thus the underlying principle is here in line with integrative thinking.  
 
The rules of decision-making and veto provisions that are stipulated in the Statutes 
show that a fundamental interest veto is included in the Mostar Statute, in line with 
consociationalism, whereas in Brcko no veto rights to the communities is included, 
thus also here is place Brcko in line with the integrative model. The findings are 
summarised below in table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5: Summary of the institutional structures, Mostar and Brcko   
Institutional principle / 
mechanism  
Mostar Statute Brcko Statute 
Territorial division of 
power 
C I 
Rules of representation 
- Electoral system 
- Ethnicity based 
 
C 
C 
 
C 
I 
Veto mechanism  C I 
 
 
Based on the presence or lack of such of the mechanisms the theoretical models entails, 
it is evident that the Mostar Statute to a large extent corresponds to the consociational 
model, whereas the Brcko Statute is closer to an integrative model. However, it would 
be wrong to say that the Brcko model is completely integrative due to the electoral 
system, where elements from the consociational model is evident, but all other 
principles are non the less in integrative lines as the focus on diminishing the role of 
ethnicity is evident and formal group protection is evident.  
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter that presented Lijphart and Horowitz’ models, 
we saw that they both argue that their model is most prone to foster elite cooperation. 
The next chapter will examine the pattern and nature of inter-ethnic elite cooperation 
in Mostar and Brcko and test these divergent expectations.  
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5. Inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko   
 
 
The second research question posed in this thesis involves a comparison and 
discussion of the institutional structures of respectively Mostar and Brcko. Which of 
the structures did most effectively contribute to the promotion of inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation? - The ambition in the following is to test the propositions inherent in the 
consociational and integrative models outlined in the theoretical chapter. The 
consociational proposition is that an institutional structure like the one in Mostar will 
most effectively promote inter-elite cooperation. The opposing integrative proposition 
is that an integrative institutional structure, like the one in Brcko, will prove to be 
more effective.  
 
Three aspects indicating the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation will be examined; i) 
the character of the process to establish the institutions devised by the Statutes in the 
two cities ii) The elites’ responses to electoral results and electoral dynamics in the 
municipality elections four years after the enactment of the two Statutes and iii) the 
functionality of the institutions in the two cities. Developments in Mostar and Brcko 
will be compared according to these three aspects, and the supposition is that the 
results will indicate the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the two cities.   
 
5. 1 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation and the establishment of the institutions  
The character of the process of establishing the political institutions in Mostar and 
Brcko provides a good indicator of the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the two 
cities immediately after the enactment of the Statutes.  If elites were not willing to 
cooperate and compromise, the process would take long and the establishment 
impeded by non-cooperative actions.  
 
The initial consociational claim is that a consociational institutional structure, like the 
one in Mostar will be most effective in the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. 
The opposing integrative claim is that an integrative structure, like the one in Brcko 
will be most effective in this respect.  It follows from these claims that according to 
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consociational expectations, the process to establish the Mostar institutions will be 
easier and faster than the process to establish the Brcko institutions. This expectation is 
based on the argument that the security mechanisms provided by the consociational 
model will make it easier for the elites to accept the institutions.  
 
According to integrative expectations, the process of establishing the Brcko 
institutions will be easier because institutions here are not based on ethnicity, but 
contain other mechanisms than security mechanisms which will promote cooperative 
dynamics.  
 
Which of these propositions does the character of the establishment process in Mostar 
after the signing of the agreement in 1996 and the character of establishment process 
in Brcko after the signing in March 2000 confirm?  
 
 
5.1.1 Establishment of the City Council, the City Government and the City-Municipality 
Councils in Mostar 
 
Background  
The establishment of the institutions in Mostar was based on the June 1996 municipal 
elections.29 The two nationalist parties, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) were the clear winners in the elections.  SDA, 
together with three small coalition parties, won 49 per cent of the votes and the HDZ 
got 46 per cent (28,505 and 26,680 respectively) (OSCE BiH 1996). A list consisting 
of five opposition non-nationalist and multi-ethnic parties polled only 1,927 votes, 
around 3,5 per cent of the total (Ibid).30
 
                                                 
29 Elections for Mostar was agreed on at the Dayton negotiations (Dayton Agreement on Implementing the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 10 November 1995, section II, I:2). The Interim Statute included a 
Decree on the Conduction of the Elections defining the technical details for organizing the elections for the City 
and City municipalities (Reichel 2000: 30). The EU was responsible for the organization of the election, and the 
election took place on 30 June 1996.  
30 The parties in the Coalition were the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), the Liberals and the Croatian Peasant’s 
Party (HSS) (Bose 2002: 117).   
 41
The two winners, the SDA-led Coalition, headed by the war-time mayor of East-
Mostar, the Bosniac Safet Ourucevic and the HDZ, led by the Croat Ivan Prackalo, had 
run electoral campaigns where their differences with regard to their future visions of 
Mostar were evident. While the SDA-led coalition called for the implementation of the 
Interim Statute and the reunification of Mostar, the HDZ had run a campaign in which 
the goals were to divide the city along the ethnic lines cemented during the war and to 
ensure the status of West-Mostar as the Croat capital of Bosnia(ICG 2000: 12).31  
 
Taking these divergent views into consideration, it is not difficult to understand that 
the process to establish the institutions became difficult and long. The non-nationalist 
opposition was weak, and the formation process was mainly in the hands of the SDA-
led Coalition and the HDZ. Despite the signature of HDZ on the Rome Agreement, 
and thereby the party’s acceptance of the institutional structure of the city determined 
in the Interim Statute,  it is evident that HDZ and the local HDZ party elites in reality 
were not willing to cooperate with the SDA-led coalition to establish the common 
institutions.  
 
HDZ resistance and the lack of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the formation process  
HDZ’s first move to impede the formation of the institutions was to refuse to recognise 
the election results (Ibid: 13).  Due to alleged irregularities at a polling station in 
Germany the HDZ declared the election results as not valid. The issue was brought to 
the EU administration which finally found no irregularities and declared the results as 
valid on 6 July 1996 (Decision of the EU Ombudsman, 6 July 1996). This had 
postponed the process and created uncertainties for one month, and continued to do so 
when then the HDZ did not accept the Ombudsman’s decision and brought the case to 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, was not yet formed, and the HDZ 
knew that it would take a long time before the Court would be able to make a decision.  
 
Interpreted by the ICG as an additional attempt to prevent the establishment of the 
institutions, was the creation of the ‘Union of Croat Municipalities’ (hereafter the 
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Union) in June 1996 where HDZ was the main actor behind the initiative.  The Union 
was meant to jointly administer West-Mostar without Bosniac participation. According 
to ICG, the creation was “clearly an attempt to institutionalize the ethnic division of 
the city administratively” and prevent Bosniac influence and cooperation (2000a: 13).  
 
Mile Puljic, President of the HDZ Mostar City Board, gave this statement in July 1997: 
“We will make an association of these three Croat municipalities into one. The 
municipal Council will be for the community of Croat municipalities, those new 
leaders will sit together. We will see a chance in the municipalities, to take the election 
in the municipalities, strengthen them and unite them and in the end to administer a 
Croat territory according to the measures of the Croat man” (Ibid: 16).32  The OHR, 
OSCE and other major international actors declared the Union “unlawful and contrary 
to the letter and spirit of the Dayton Agreement” (Ibid).  
 
Another action, with the same intention, namely to prolong the establishment process 
was the HDZ’ objection to the inclusion of a ‘vital-interest’ clause into the Statutes of 
the six City-Municipalities. This, according to ICG, contributed to the postponement 
of the formation of the City Municipality Councils (Ibid: 13).    
 
In addition, HDZ prolonged the formation process by objecting to SDA dominance in 
the City Council,33 and by refusing to accept the ethnic distribution of seats in the six 
Municipality Councils agreed on in the Interim Statute. The pre-assignment of seats 
was based on the 1991 census and thus pre-war settlement patterns. HDZ argued for 
and wanted the majority of seats in the municipalities were Croats now were in 
majority. 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 The statement was printed in the newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija 2 July, 1996 and quoted by the ICG.  
33 The Council consisted of 37 seats. SDA was able to gain 21 seats, the 16 reserved for Bosniacs and the five 
seats reserved for ‘others’ because the Serbs and other non-Bosniacs on the SDA list gained more votes than 
those on the HDZ list.  
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International involvement  
The HDZ strategy to prevent the establishment of the institutions seemed to work, but 
the EU and USA put pressure on the Tudjman regime in Zagreb to force HDZ-Bosnia 
to accept the election results and cooperate to form the institutions (ICG 2000a: 13; 
Bose 2002: 117). A failure to do so would harm Croatia’s relations with the EU (ICG 
2000a: 13). Thus, due to Croatian pressure, the HDZ agreed to token participation in 
the City Council, on the condition that the first mayor would be a Croat. HDZ agreed 
that the City Council would convene in August and appoint the mayor and the deputy 
mayor and to establish the City Government according to the Interim Statute (Joint 
Action-agreement 1996). At the first session of the City Council in August 1996, the 
Croat Ivan Prskalo became the mayor and Bosniac Safet Orucevic became deputy 
mayor. A City Government was subsequently formed. Pressure, and not institutional 
logic finally led to the formation of the City Council and the City Government.  
 
The formation of the six City-Municipality Councils, however, did not take place 
before June 1997. The SDA threatened to boycott the upcoming September elections if 
the Councils were not formed. Again, pressure dynamics spurred the formation, not 
actions of cooperation.  
 
Mostar – a long and difficult process  
As this examination shows, the process to establish the power-sharing institutions in 
Mostar took long. The last institutions were not established until June 1997, one year 
after the election. The process was difficult due to recurrent HDZ refusal of 
cooperation and their determination to exclude Bosniac political elites.  
 
Even if mechanisms that secured the representation and co-decision of the ethnic 
groups were in place, there were few signs of inter-ethnic cooperation and willingness 
in the political elites to get the institutions to function. Especially the Croat elite was 
negative to the new institutions. The institutional set up seemed to have had a marginal 
influence on the elite’s behaviour and patterns of cooperation.  
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5.1.2 Establishment of the District Assembly and the District Government in Brcko 
 
Background 
In Brcko, the establishment of the District Assembly and the District Government after 
the signing of the Brcko Statute was in several respects different from that in Mostar. 
Most importantly, the International Community did not choose to establish the 
institutions through elections. Instead the supervisor was given the task to appoint the 
representatives, the heads of departments, the mayor and the deputy mayor.  
Thus, it is natural that the establishment and the formation of the governance 
institutions in Brcko did not develop the same dynamics and issues of conflict as in 
Mostar institutions, which were based on election results close after the war. The 
reactions to the appointments, which will be accounted for below, nonetheless give 
insight into the attitudes and behaviour of the elites.  
 
During March 2000 the Brcko Supervisor Robert Farrand appointed the mayor and a 
deputy-mayor, the District Government and the District Assembly. The appointments 
took place in cooperation with the OSCE, the International Peace Implementation 
Council and other international organisations (ICG 2003a: 13). The basis for the 
appointments was primarily lists of candidates submitted by the political parties (OHR 
Press Release 2000a). As noted earlier, no pre set-ethnic quota system or reserved 
seats guided the appointments. The Supervisor “sought to appoint persons in an 
ethnically, politically and gender-balanced way” (ICG 2003a: 13).  
 
The District Government, appointed by Farrand 8 March 2000, consisted of nine 
department heads, a mayor and a deputy-mayor. The Serb Sinisa Kisic, who 
previously had been the mayor of the RS part of the municipality, became mayor. One 
of the department heads (a Croat) was also assigned to be deputy-mayor. Among the 
10 department heads, 4 were Bosniacs, 4 were Serbs and 2 were Croats (Supervisory 
Order 2000b)  
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On 21 March the 29 members of the District Assembly were appointed (Supervisory 
Order 2000c). Among the members, 13 were Serbs, 9 were Bosniacs and 7 were 
Croats. Compared to the 1997 election results and power balance between Serbs, 
Bosniacs and Croats, the Serbs (with 13 seats) were deprived of the majority they had 
enjoyed in the Assembly elected in 1997 in the former RS municipality. The Bosniacs 
(nine seats) were under-represented when compared to their pre-war share of the 
population, but they got the post of assembly president. Croats got seven seats, under-
represented according to their 1991 share of the population (25,4 per cent) but over-
represented in terms of their share of the population in 2000 (ICG 2003a: 13). 
 
Reluctant cooperation 
How did the parties react to the ethnic distribution of seats? According to Robert 
Farrand, the supervisor at the time, all parties reacted, but no incidences of boycott or 
obstruction occurred (Farrand 2006).  The Social Democrat Party (SDP) came to see 
Farrand in order to gain one more seat in the Assembly, but Farrand did not meet this 
demand (ibid). 34 All the Bosnian Serb parties, this surprised Farrand, accepted the 
numbers without formal protests, and the Bosnian Croat parties were pleased, since 
their number of seats was doubled compared to the 1997 electoral result (Ibid).  
 
These reactions suggest that the political elites accepted the power-sharing model and 
did not impede the establishment of the institutions. The ethnic distribution of seats 
was not pre-set, and accordingly the composition of the Assembly determined by 
Farrand could have been an issue for discussions and protests that would have 
prolonged the establishment process.  
 
However, the relationship between the different national political elites in Brcko 
should not be seen as easy and harmonious. Farrand characterised the relationship 
between the main parties in March 2000 as one where they “were hardly getting 
along”, and that conflicts existed (ibid). Nevertheless, the mere acceptance of the 
                                                 
34 The SDP is characterized as a multiethnic political party, but according to Farrand, the local branch was 
mainly consisting of Bosniacs.  
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appointments and the distribution of seats put forward by Farrand, point in the 
direction that the elites were willing to cooperate, and that the relief to “be in the 
game” was stronger than the negative attitudes (ibid). The inaugural session for the 
District Assembly was held on 31 March 2000 (ICG 2003a: 13).   
 
Brcko – an easy process  
As this examination has shown, the process to establish the power-sharing institutions 
in Brcko went quickly and without major obstructions or impeding actions from the 
elites. The institutions were established immediately after the enactment of the statute 
and the appointments.  
 
However, the International Community, and most importantly the Brcko supervisor, 
were the main actors in the process. The ethnic distribution of seats was balanced and 
Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs were represented in the institutions. International actors 
replaced the security mechanism the institutional structure was lacking with respect to 
ensured representation. That the process was entirely international driven gave the 
elites a minimal room for potential obstruction.   
 
Notwithstanding, elite behaviour after the appointments shows that elites from all the 
three ethnic groups were willing to accept to the supervisor’s appointments, and for 
that reason the institutions were formed without delay.  
 
5.1.3 Theory and practice: inter-ethnic elite cooperation and the establishment of power-
sharing institutions  
 
The initial proposition was that if a consociational structure is more effective in the 
promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation than an integrative structure, the 
establishment process in Mostar would be easier than the one in Brcko. If on the 
contrary an integrative structure is more effective in inter-ethnic elite cooperation 
promotion, the process in Brcko would be easier. The character of the establishment 
process can be seen as an indicator on the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation.  
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The examination of two establishment processes has shown that the process in Brcko 
was quick and relatively easy, while the one in Mostar was long and fraught with 
conflicts and non-cooperative behaviour. This, seemingly, confirms the expectations of 
the integrative camp, while the consociationalists ought to be disappointed. And in fact   
it seems as if the security mechanisms in the Mostar structure did little to contribute to 
promote the dynamics expected by Lijphart. While Lijphart prophesizes that elites will 
actively engage in cooperation with ethnic adversaries, both based on moral and 
rational motivations, elites in Mostar did neither seem interested in nor willing to 
cooperate and share power. The HDZ elites were interested in preventing power-
sharing. This was expressed through a number of actions that impeded the formation 
of the institutions. The behaviour of the Croat elites in Mostar and their lack of 
motivation to cooperate justify Horowitz criticism of Lijphart’s assumptions about 
elite motivations for cooperation.  
 
Elites in Brcko both accepted the institutional structures and cooperated, although 
reluctantly. However, no major protests were promoted. Even if the system lacked the 
group protection mechanisms Lijphart prescribes, the elites were willing to participate 
and engage in the power-sharing institutions.   
 
The findings have also shown that international actors played an important role in the 
process to establish the institutions both in Mostar and Brcko.  In Mostar, international 
actors put hard pressure on the elites to form the institutions, while in Brcko the 
supervisor had a more direct role due to his role in appointing the Assembly and the 
Government. 
 
This is relevant for several reasons. Firstly, the behaviour of the elites in Brcko and 
their acceptance despite the lack of security mechanisms can be explained by the fact 
that the supervisor and the international administration functioned as a security 
mechanism. The supervisor made sure that all groups were represented. Instead of 
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institutional security, the Brcko elites was secured both representation and co-decision 
through international mechanisms.   
 
Secondly, both in Mostar and Brcko it was international actor dynamics, not 
institutional dynamics, as expected in the consociational and integrative approaches, 
that was the main driving force and determinant in the establishment process.  
 
These two insights provide good grounds for arguing that the international actor 
dimension and the incentives, constraints and motivations created by this actor are 
important factors in the analysis of the relation between institutional structure and 
promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation after contemporary civil wars.  
 
5.2 Electoral dynamics and elite responses to representation rules   
The response of the elites to electoral dynamics and representation rules in the Mostar 
2000 municipality and the Brcko 2004 municipality is a good indicator on the nature 
of and the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation four years after the establishment of 
the institutions.  If the elites did not want to cooperate, the responses would be non-
cooperative responses aimed at excluding elites from other nationalities.  
When the electoral dynamics after the Mostar 2000 elections and the Brcko 2004 
election is analysed, it should be possible to get an interesting perspective on the 
success – or lack of success - of our two models.  
 
 
5.2.1 The Mostar 2000 municipality election  
Background: Election results- victory for nationalist parties  
In the 2000 municipality election in Mostar the two nationalist parties, HDZ and SDA 
were the two clear winners and managed to get 80 per cent of the votes. HDZ got 43 
per cent and SDA 37 per cent. SDP increased its share since the 1997 elections and 
obtained 13 per cent of the votes (OSCE BiH 2000). The other non-nationalist parties 
gained the 7 per cent marginal remaining share (Ibid).  
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Elite responses to the election results: Grand coalition formation  
Based on these electoral results, the nationalist parties were the dominant actors in the 
post-electoral coalition formation process. The elites from both HDZ and SDA 
responded to the electoral results cooperatively, without objections. The post-electoral 
implementation went quickly and a post-electoral collation between SDA and HDZ 
was formed. The Bosniac Safet Orucevic (SDA) was elected mayor and the Croat 
Neven Tomic (HDZ) was elected deputy mayor 23 June 2000 (OHR Media Round Up 
2000a). SDA and HDZ also formed the City Government together, and the mayor 
appointed the heads of departments from all nationalities (ibid). Both a grand ruling 
coalition; the City Government, and the City Council were thus formed through 
cooperation.  
 
Elite responses to mechanisms for representation  
The rules of representation in Mostar were, as previously outlined, based on a pre-
definition of quotas that should ensure the representation of all the three largest ethnic 
groups in the political institutions. After the 2000 municipal elections the allocation of 
seats in accordance with the quotas defined in the Statute, started. The process, 
however, showed that the system in addition to ensuring representation, also 
contributed to increase the influence of the nationalist parties. This effect of the quota 
system was possible because the nationalist parties, according to Bose, had figured out 
the logic behind the system (Bose 2002: 122). Their response to the mechanism had 
prior to the election been a strategic selection of candidates (Ibid). This act can be seen 
as rational, but had the consequence that the parties less willing to cooperate and rule 
inclusively filled the quotas.   
 
In the Mostar South-West municipality, where the Croats were entitled to 12 out of 25 
seats, the HDZ retained majority control by winning 15 seats. That several Serbs 
included on the HDZ list were elected contributed to make this possible. In Mostar-
West, Croats were supposed to fill only 10 seats, but the HDZ won 15 seats here as 
well, again including a number of Serb candidates. In Mostar-South, where Croats 
were entitled to a maximum of 12 seats, the HDZ won 19 of the 25 seats, including at 
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least three Bosniacs in addition to several Serbs. Similarly, in each of the three 
Bosniac dominated city-municipalities, the SDA list gained the majority of seats.35  
 
It can be argued that what the quota system contributed to in Mostar was the 
promotion of multi-ethnic party lists. The nationalist parties responded to the 
mechanism by including their ethnic adversaries. Notwithstanding, neither HDZ nor 
SDA in the Mostar region can be seen, according to Bose. to represent the interests of 
other than the Croats and Bosniacs, respectively (Ibid). 
 
In addition, the pre-defined quotas did contribute to give the most marginal of the 
three groups, the Serbs, a certain representation in the City Council that would 
otherwise not been the case (Bose 2002: 123). The SDA’s city councillors included 
prominent local Serbs, Milan Jovicic and Ratko Pejanovic, and Jovicic subsequently 
became the deputy speaker of the City Council (Bose, 2002: 123). 
 
Mostar 2000: post-electoral nationalist cooperation and  
Electoral dynamics and elite responses to rules of representation in relation to the 
Mostar 2000 election has shown that elites responded to the electoral results by 
engaging in the establishment of a grand coalition. In the City Council all three groups, 
Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats, were represented, and that the Serb representatives were 
ensured representation through the reserved seats quota system. Thus, overall, the 
elites responded inclusively and with willingness to cooperate.  
 
5.2.2 The Brcko 2004 municipal elections  
Background: Election results - a strong moderate block  
In the municipality election in Brcko, nationalist parties together gained 44 per cent of 
the votes. SDA obtained 10 per cent, HDZ 7 per cent and the Serb nationalist party, 
the Serb Democratic party (SDS) won 17 per cent. Among the more moderate parties, 
SDP won 19 percent of the votes, the Union of Independent Socialists (SNSD) 
                                                 
35 The source of these figures is the detailed results of the April 2000 Bosnian local elections posted on the 
OSCE-BiH webside, www.oscebih.org  
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obtained 5 per cent and a coalition consisting of the Croat Peasants Party (HSS) and 
the New Croat Initiative (NHI) won 4 per cent (The Bosnian Electoral Commission 
2004). Hence, the non-nationalist block in Brcko was much stronger than in the 
Mostar 2000 elections.  
 
Elite responses to election results and mechanisms for representation  
The post-electoral negotiations brought together a coalition of moderate Serb, Bosniac 
and Croat parties after the nationalists failed to gain support in the District Assembly 
(Bieber 2005: 429). The coalition consisted of seven parties with SDP, SNSD and 
HSS-NHI as the lading parties. The SDP’s candidate to become mayor, Mirsad Djapo, 
was elected by the Assembly in December 2004 (OHR Media Round Up 2004).  
 
Djapo appointed the District Government on 31 December 2004. The ‘grand coalition’ 
consisted of eleven department heads coming from the seven majority parties in the 
Assembly (OHR Media Round Up 2005c). Of the 11 appointees, there were five Serb, 
three Bosniac and three Croat members (Ibid). The appointments made by the mayor 
met criticism, but the critics were related to party belongings, not directly to the 
national composition of the government. The Mayor Djapo stated that:  “I am satisfied 
that the objections were made in relation to only three departments and not more. This 
means I have reached an optimum. It is important no person has made any remarks 
with regard to national composition of the government or with regard to its quality” 
(OHR Media Round up 2005a).  On 18 January 2005 the delegates of the Brcko 
District Assembly endorsed the proposal of the government’s composition put forward 
by Djapo (OHR media Round up 2000b). 
 
Brcko 2004: inclusive behaviour and moderate post-electoral coalition formation  
A stringing feature with the elites’ responses to the election results in Brcko was their 
willingness to cooperate and to engage in the formation of a broad coalition. All 
parties responded inclusively and objections related to national composition were not 
promoted.  
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5.2.3 Theory and practice: inter-ethnic elite cooperation and electoral dynamics  
The initial proposition was that if a consociational structure is more effective in the 
promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation than an integrative structure, the elites in 
Mostar would respond to electoral dynamics and rules of representation with more 
inclusive behaviour than the elites in Brcko.  
 
The examination of the Mostar 2000 and the Brcko 2004 municipal elections has 
shown that the elites in both cities responded inclusively, and that it is difficult to 
identify any differences in the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. Neither in Brcko 
nor in Mostar did elites express any objections or exclusivist responses. 
 
These inclusive responses in both cities can be seen as a confirmation of both 
Lijphart’s and Horowitz’ expectations related to institutional structure and promotion 
of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. Based on findings from Mostar and Brcko, 
cooperation in the implementation of electoral results some time after the initial 
establishment of the structures is not more difficult within an institutional 
consociational framework than in an integrative one.  
 
Nevertheless, the findings have shown some interesting results related to Horowitz’ 
criticism of the PR system and Lijphart’s endorsement of ethnicity-based ensured 
representation which in practice can involve reserved seats and ethnic quota systems.  
 
As previously outlined, Horowitz favours a preferential electoral system. He maintains 
that the PR system has negative consequences for party system developments and for 
the nature of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. His argument is that the PR system makes 
it difficult for moderate parties to attract voters and to be able to gain influence. The 
findings from Mostar and Brcko in this respect point in different directions. While the 
Mostar electoral results, where nationalist parties gained 80 per cent of the votes and 
were able to dominate all institutions, the Brcko results show that non-nationalist 
moderate parties attracted more votes than the nationalist ones, and where able to gain 
power through the formation of a wide coalition. Brcko had as previously shown 
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adopted a structure in integrative model, but with the PR system. The party 
developments in Brcko shows that moderate parties can develop and succeed in a PR 
system.  
 
Related to a reserved seats system and Lijphart’s endorsement of mechanisms that 
ensure the representation of all groups, the findings have shown that such a mechanism 
has a side effect not emphasised by Lijphart. The system is easy to manipulate and in 
Mostar the reserved seats contributed to increase the influence of the nationalist parties, 
the one less likely to be willing to cooperate. In Mostar, the system secured the groups 
representation, but in addition was a tool for the nationalist parties to secure their 
position.  In Brcko, where such a system is not included, none of the groups were 
nonetheless excluded.   
 
5.3 Functionality of the institutions 
 
The functionality and ability to make and implement decisions of the political 
institutions in Mostar and Brcko is a good indicator on the level of inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation in the two cities. A feature of power-sharing institutions is that their 
functionality is dependent on the actual cooperation of elites. Non-cooperation results 
in ineffective institutions.  
 
Is the consociationalist or integrative position confirmed when examining the 
functionality of the consociational institutions in Mostar from 1997 to 2004 and the 
integrative institutions in Brcko from 2000 to 2004?  
 
5.3.1 Elite cooperation and functionality of the Mostar institutions 1997-2004  
 
1997-1999: hampered functionality 
After the long process of establishing the institutions in Mostar, the situation continued 
to be difficult. It was hard to get the institutions to function. In October 1997 the High 
Representative regarded the situation and developments in Mostar with concern and 
 54
wrote that “the situation in Mostar continues to be volatile with the Croat partners not 
yet having honoured its obligation to dissolve the Union of the three West Mostar 
municipalities” (HR 1997). The Croat partners he refers to is the HDZ Mostar elite. 
The Union of West Mostar municipalities was a parallel illegal institutional structure 
established by the HDZ as an attempt to exclude Bosniac councillors from decision-
making (ICG 2000a). 
 
With the continued existence of the Union of Croat Municipalities the six common 
City-Municipality Councils and the common city institutions established subsequent to 
the Interim Statute, were effectively put out of function. The Union functioned as the 
main institution of interest and the only institution that mattered for most of the Croat 
elites.  
 
In 1999 the HR remarked that “the situation in Mostar has not yet seen any significant 
improvement due to obstruction of both sides” (HR 1999a) and later the same year it is 
noted that “Mostar remains in serious deadlock” (HR 1999b). In commenting on the 
work of the City Government, Bose (2002: 117) characterises the City Government in 
this period as “weak and ineffectual”. The government, he argues, was paralysed by 
“Croat-Muslim hostility” (Ibid).  
 
 
2000: Year of progress  
During 2000, the climate for cooperation seemed to improve and the institutions 
started to hold sessions permanently. The HR wrote:  
“Since my last report, the situation in the City of Mostar and the Herzegovina-
Nerevta Canton has improved considerably. This progress has been achieved 
mainly due to the new positive approach by certain politicians to work together. 
This movement, led by Deputy Mayor Neven Tomic (Croat) with the assistance 
of Mayor Orucevic (Bosniac), and by some Cantonal officials, has resolved 
issues in this short period of time which have been plaguing the City of Mostar 
for the past three years” (HR 2000).  
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In July 2000 the PIC Steering Board also noted these attempts by “responsible 
politicians in Mostar to find pragmatic forms of cooperation across ethnic divide” (PIC 
2000).  Finn Lynghjem, the Mostar OHR Deputy at the time, confirmed these positive 
developments (Lynghjem 2006). He particularly emphasised that the City Government 
which had been virtually non-existent prior to 2000, started to meet frequently and that 
the mayors of the six city municipalities and the mayor and deputy mayor all signed 
the Mostar Document where they agreed to improve the functionality of the 
institutions (Ibid). In addition, Lynghjem pointed at the importance of a functioning 
cooperation between the Mayor Tomic and the Deputy Mayor Orucevic (Ibid). 
 
However, a problem among the elites in Mostar was their willingness to sign 
documents, but their reluctance to implement and stick to the agreements in practice 
(Lynghjem 2006). The positive trends did not seem to result in concrete 
implementations of efficient policy-making.  
 
2001-2004: hampered functionality   
This is confirmed when the High Representative in 2003 stated that “the continuing 
division of Mostar remained a serious problem during the reporting period. Eight years 
after the war, the City of Mostar is a collection of municipalities without coordination 
and without the capacity to generate the development of the City” (HR 2003).  
 
Also the cooperation between the major and the deputy-major, and the functionality of 
the institutions seemed to have stopped. The City’s institutions had virtually by 2003 
ceased to operate. In October 2003 the Daily Dnevni List states that the City 
Government had not met in formal sessions for eight month (OHR Media Round Up 
2003). That the level of contact between the different mayors from the Bonsac and 
Croat city municipalities was low is confirmed by a statement by one of the mayors. 
He stated that he “meets with the opposite numbers from the other side only for formal 
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meetings with international officials designed for photographing, smiling and getting 
donations, after which each participant returns to his own yard” (ICG 2003b: 3).36
 
In this situation, a Commission for reforming the City of Mostar was established. The 
final 2003 report provide legitimisations for a reform. It claims that “parallel systems 
exists in order to serve the interest of specific constitute people rather than existing to 
perform a more general civic duty (Commission Report 2003: 12). In the report a 
number of indications related to functionality that underline the low level of inter-
ethnic elite cooperation are referred to (Ibid).  
 - The six city municipalities functioned in reality as two separate blocks.  
 - The City Council has not realised any of its functions  
 - The Mayor and the Deputy Mayor were working in parallel to each other  
- The City has remained divided with rampant parallelism and complete lack of 
cooperation between the mayor and deputy mayor.  
 
Judged from this development of institutional functionality the level of cooperation 
between the elites representing different nationalities in Mostar was low.  
 
5.3.2 Elite cooperation and functionality of the Brcko institutions 2000-2005 
 
2000-2004: efficiency and progress under international administration 
From the very beginning of the establishment of the Brcko institutions the HR noted 
how well the institutions established after the enactment of the Brcko District Statute 
were functioning. “The multi-ethnic Government and the Assembly are in place and 
fully operational”, the HR noted in October 2000 (HR 2000). In the period from its 
establishment and the inaugural session on 31 March 2000 to end of November 2000, 
the District Assembly had succeeded in agreeing on and adopted 10 district laws (Ibid).  
 
The progress continued and in 2001.  One year after the establishment of the District 
and its institutions the HR continued to be satisfied with the developments in Brcko 
                                                 
36 ICG interview with Vjekoslav Kordic, Mayor of municipality south, 5 September 2003.  
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(HR 2001). In the end of 2001, the complete reintegration of the three administrative 
structures of the three pre-war municipalities into one was seen as completed (HR 
2002).  
 
In 2002, the High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch expressed his satisfaction with 
the progress made in Brcko, and emphasised the successful establishment of a multi-
ethnic integrated school system, judiciary reform and reconstruction and return (OHR 
Press Release 2002). These had all been difficult issues that had required cooperation 
between the politicians from all the three ethnic groups.  
 
In 2003 the District Assembly passed 39 laws and amendments. According to the 
Supervisor, the “Assembly continued to play a constructive role” in the 
implementation of the requirements agreed on in the Final Award (Supervisor Report, 
2004: IIIa).  
 
2004-2005: Efficiency and progress with elected politicians    
In the first half of 2005 it is remarked that the Brcko District’s multiethnic institutions 
functioned effectively and permanently. The HR emphasised the elected Assembly’s 
and the Government’s reputation, which he finds well deserved, as being “one of the 
most effective and multi-national administrations in BiH”. The items set to be 
implemented in the 1999 Final Award had with exception of a few points been 
implemented (HR 2005).  
 
Judged from the over-all progress on the developments in Brcko and the fulfilment of 
agreed agreements, the level of cooperation between the elites in Brcko can be seen as 
high.  
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5.3.3 Theory and practice – elite cooperation and functionality of power-sharing 
institutions  
 
The initial proposition was that if a consociational structure is more effective in the 
promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation than the integrative structure, the 
functionality of the Mostar institutions would be better than the Brcko institutions. If, 
on the contrary, an integrative structure is more effective, the Brcko institutions would 
function more effectively.  
 
The overview of the functionality of the Mostar and Brcko institutions has shown that 
while the Brcko institutions were recurrently praised for their functionality and ability 
to devise laws and implement decisions, concerns and negative remarks characterises   
the Mostar record. This gives support to the integrative claim, that an integrative 
institutional structure, like the one in Brcko, is more effective in the promotion of 
inter-ethnic elite cooperation.  
 
Again Lijphart’s elite assumptions regarding elites’ wiliness to cooperate within a 
system that provides political security, as in Mostar, seem to be disconfirmed. 
Moreover, the record of the functionality of the common institutions in Mostar shows 
that the decentralised structure of the city, with two layers of governance and 
administration, the common City Council and the common City Government as one 
layer and the six City-municipality Councils and administrations as an additional layer, 
impeded the development of effective institutions and thus the functionality.  
 
 
The city municipality institutions became the main locus of powers and the institutions 
the elites perceived as the one of importance. The common institutions became empty 
shells that only in short periods met frequently and were thus unable to perform its 
tasks and duties. This development was not the intention in 1996 when the institutional 
structure of Mostar was determined. The Mostar Statute even entails an article that 
states that “the city-municipalities can transfer tasks in their competences to the City 
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of Mostar by a resolution of the city-municipality council” (Mostar Statute 1996: Art. 
53(1)). Such transfers did not happen. And the common institutions did not manage to 
decide on or implement the tasks assigned to them by the Statute (ICG 2002: 29-56).     
 
It seems that the mechanism of autonomy proposed by Lijphart as a security 
mechanism for promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in practice contributed to 
maintain a politically and administratively divided city.  
 
In Brcko, on the contrary, the unification of the three pre-war municipalities was 
successfully implemented and the only layer of institutions, the District Government 
and the District Assembly without veto provisions, functioned according to the Statute.  
 
Notwithstanding, the international actor dimension again have to be emphasised. 
While the Brcko institutions until 2004 operated in close cooperation with and under 
close supervision of the international administration, international actors through in the 
same direct manner were not involved in Mostar political life. This can contribute to 
explain differences in the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the two cities, and 
thus again points in the direction that this actor dimension needs to be included when 
theoretically treating the relation between institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation in Post-Cold war divided societies.  
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6. Summary and conclusions  
 
In this thesis the aim has been, within a defined theoretical framework, to examine the 
relations between institutional structures and inter-ethnic elite cooperation after civil 
war. The theoretical point of departure was a discussion and comparison of the 
consociational and the integrative models. Both these models claim that the principles 
and institutional devices they prescribe, are the ones most likely to contribute to inter-
ethnic elite cooperation in ethnic divided societies.  
 
In order to test these viewpoints, the thesis has presented a comparative study of Brcko 
and Mostar. The examination has been undertaken through a two-step analysis. The 
first question posed was which elements of the consociational and integrative models 
could be identified in the Mostar Interim Statute and the Brcko District Statute. The 
second issue was to uncover which of the structures described in Mostar and Brcko 
that most effectively contributed to create a fertile ground for inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation. The following will first provide a summary of the findings and some 
concluding remarks.  
 
6.1 The mechanisms and principles in the Mostar and Brcko Statutes – A 
consociational or integrative structure?  
 
The findings has shown that while the Statute of Mostar stipulated an institutional 
system and principles in line with the consociational model, the Brcko statute defined 
the institutions and principles valid for Brcko more in line with the integrative model.  
The elements analysed were the principles for division of power, the principles and 
mechanisms for rules of representation and whether veto provisions were included.  
 
Related to the first aspect, territorial division of power, the Mostar Statute devised the 
city in small homogenous units with wide powers of autonomy, thus in line with 
consociationalism, while the Brcko statutes integrated three pre-war municipalities 
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into one heterogeneous unit and only one institutional layer, in line with integrative 
thinking.  
 
Related to the second aspect, rules and principles for representation, the Mostar Statute 
stipulated PR and reserved seats according to ethnicity, as in consociationalism, while 
the Brcko Statute did not give references to ethnicity as a basis for the institutional 
composition of seats, but adopted a PR system. For Brcko, thus, the pictures is here 
mixed.  
 
Related to the third aspect, veto as a security mechanism was included in the Mostar 
Statute, as in the consociational model, while there was no such mechanism introduced 
in Brcko.  The findings are summarised in table 6.1 below.  
 
Table 6.1:  Summary of the institutional structures, Mostar and Brcko   
 
Institutional principle / 
mechanism  
Mostar Statute Brcko Statute 
Territorial division of 
power 
C I 
Rules of representation 
- Electoral system 
- Ethnicity based 
 
C 
C 
 
C 
I 
Veto mechanism  C I 
 
 
In sum, the institutional system in Mostar can be seen as a consociational one, and 
hence be placed within the consociational paradigm. On the other hand, the structures 
in Brcko included several principles emphasised in the integrative paradigm.  
 
 
6.2 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko 
 
The initial propositions set out to test were two fundamental claims inherent in the 
consociational and the integrative models. The consociational claim is that an  
institutional structure, like the one in Mostar, would most likely contribute to inter-
ethnic elite cooperation. The opposing integrative claim is that an integrative 
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institutional structure, like the one adopted in Brcko, would be most prone to foster 
inter-ethnic cooperation.  
 
In order to test these propositions, the nature of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar 
from 1996-2004 and in Brcko from 2000-2004 were examined. Cooperation between 
elites is not a fixed variable, but through an examination of how elites behaved in the 
process of establishing the institutions, of how elites responded to electoral dynamics 
and how well the institutions in the two cities functioned, will provide a good set of 
indicators of the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation.  
 
The examination of the establishment process and nature of cooperation has shown 
that the elites in Mostar found it hard to cooperate and also obstructed the formation 
process through different strategies. The process was long and difficult. Institutions 
were first established one year after the elections, and the process was fraught with 
conflicts between the main nationalist parties HDZ and SDA. The institutional system 
with security guarantees had minimal influence on the behaviour and motivations of 
the elites. In Brcko, however, the establishment process went quickly and without 
obstructive actions from the elites. Institutions without group protection met 
surprisingly little resistance.   
 
The examination of electoral dynamics and how elites responded to rules of 
representation, has shown that elites both in Mostar and Brcko responded inclusively, 
and that it was difficult to identify any differences in levels of cooperation on this 
point.  
 
The examination of the functionality of the institutions has shown that the Brcko 
institutions produced a higher level of concrete output through laws and 
implementations, in addition to meeting permanently, while the Mostar institutions did 
not succeed in implementing any of the concrete tasks it was outlined to perform. They 
did not convene permanently. This indicates that elites in Brcko more easily 
cooperated than in Mostar, despite of the lack of security mechanisms and within a 
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system containing the integrative mechanisms mentioned by Horowitz. The 
mechanisms in the Mostar, however, did not seem to spur cooperative motivations.  
 
Based on these findings the initial integrative claim seems to be supported. Elites 
cooperated more actively and with less conflict in Brcko than in Mostar. The security 
mechanism Lijphart prescribes did little to unite the elites in Mostar. However, the 
findings also suggest that devising institutional structures that can accommodate the 
needs of elites from different ethnic groups after a civil war, is a difficult task. Trust 
and cooperation, regardless of institutional design, are factors that need time to 
develop.  
 
It must be mentioned that it is likely that international actors also are an influencing 
factor in these processes. On the one hand, the international community can create 
security and be a support. On the other hand, the international community can 
dominate political life and make the elites less important actors. In both cases, it is 
likely to assume that international actors will effect the incentives and motivations for 
elites to cooperate.  
 
6.3 Institutional structure, international involvement and elite cooperation 
 
Horowitz and Lijpahrt’s models were developed in a different context than the pre-
civil war environment of the 1990s. As this examination shows, institutional structure 
is not the only point effecting inter-ethnic cooperation. In examining elite cooperation 
and institutional structure a wider frame than the one the consociational and integrative 
structure offer is needed, because a number of factors affect this relationship.  
 
While the international actor dimension is completely ignored in both Lijphart’s and 
Horowitz’ assumptions of elite behaviour and responses to institutional structure, the 
comparison of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko has found that this 
factor is likely to interfere in the interplay between institutional structure and inter-
ethnic relations. This does not make the different institutional power-sharing 
institutions proposed by integrativists of consociationalists less valid, but speaks in 
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favour of the need to critically examine, possibly revise and expand the assumptions 
concerning elite behaviour the models are vested on. Such a revision is, however, not 
the purpose of this thesis. Suffice to say here is that international actors are likely to be 
engaged in future operations that are aimed at creating stability and peace and will 
continue to be influenced by the writings of Lijphart and Horowitz. Institutional 
structures in close resemblance to their model are likely to be devised also for future 
post-civil war societies.  
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Appendix 1: Map of BiH  
 
 
 
 
Source: University of Texas, Map Library. Acceded 16 Mai 2006: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/bosnia_pol_2002.jpg
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Appendix 2: Detailed map of Mostar  
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Appendix 3: Map, District of Brcko  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/93/Brcko02.png
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Appendix 4: Institutional structure, Mostar 
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Appendix 4: Institutional structure, Brcko  
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